













A  
V O Y A G E  
R O U N D T H E  
W O R L D,  
In the Years MDCCXL, I, II, III, IV.

B Y  
GEORGE ANSON, Esq;  
Now LORD ANSON,  
Commander in Chief of a Squadron of His Majesty's  
Ships, sent upon an Expedition to the *South-Seas*.

C O M P I L E D  
From his PAPERS and MATERIALS,  
By RICHARD WALTER, M. A.  
Chaplain of his MAJESTY'S Ship the *Centurion*, in that Expedition.  
Illustrated with Forty-Two COPPER-PLATES.

T H E N I N T H E D I T I O N .

L O N D O N :

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T O  
HIS GRACE  
J O H N,  
DUKE of BEDFORD,  
MARQUIS of TAVISTOCK,  
EARL of BEDFORD,  
BARON RUSSEL,  
BARON RUSSEL of Thornhaugh,  
A N D  
BARON HOWLAND of Streatham;

One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State; and  
Lord-Lieutenant, and Custos Rotulorum of the  
County of BEDFORD.

*My LORD,*

THE following Narrative of a very singular naval achievement is addressed to Your GRACE, both on account of the infinite obligations which the Commander in Chief at all times professes



## DEDICATION.

to have received from your Friendship; and also, as the Subject itself naturally claims the patronage of One, under whose direction, the *British* Navy has resumed its ancient Spirit and Lustre, and has in one summer ennobled itself by two victories, the most decisive, and (if the strength and number of the captures be considered) the most important, that are to be met with in our Annals. Indeed, an uninterrupted series of success, and a manifest superiority gained universally over the enemy, both in commerce and glory, seem to be the necessary effects of a revival of strict discipline, and of an unbiaſſed regard to merit and service. These are marks that must distinguish the happy period of time in which Your GRACE presided, and afford a fitter subject for history, than for an address of this nature. Very signal advantages of rank and distinction, obtained and secured to the naval profession by Your GRACE's auspicious influence, will remain a lasting monument of Your unwearied zeal and attachment to it, and be for ever remembered with the highest gratitude, by all who shall be employed in it. As these were the generous rewards of past exploits, they will be likewise the noblest incentives, and surest pledges of the future. That Your GRACE's eminent talents, magnanimity, and disinterested zeal;

# DEDICATION.

whence the Public has already reaped such signal benefits, may in all times prove equally successful in advancing the prosperity of *Great-Britain*, is the ardent wish of,

*My LORD,*

*Your GRACE's*

*Most obedient,*

*Most devoted,*

AND

*Most humble Servants,*

RICHARD WALTER.

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# INTRODUCTION.

**N**OTWITHSTANDING the great improvement of navigation within the last two Centuries, a Voyage round the World is still considered as an enterprize of so very singular a nature, that the Public have never failed to be extremely inquisitive about the various accidents and turns of fortune, with which this uncommon attempt is generally attended. And though the amusement expected in these narrations, is doubtless one great source of that curiosity, with the bulk of readers; yet the more intelligent part of mankind have always agreed, that from accounts of this nature, if faithfully executed, the more important purposes of navigation, commerce, and national interest may be greatly promoted: For every authentic description of foreign coasts and countries will contribute to one or more of these great ends, in proportion to the wealth, wants, or commodities of those countries, and our ignorance of those coasts; and therefore a Voyage round the World promises a species of information of all others the most desirable and interesting; since great part of it is performed in seas, with which we are as yet but very imperfectly acquainted, and in the neighbourhood of a country renowned for the abundance of its wealth, though it is at the same time stigmatized for its poverty, in the necessaries and conveniencies of a civilized life.

These considerations have occasioned the compiling the ensuing work; which, in gratifying the inquisitive disposition of mankind, and contributing to the safety and success of future navigators, and to the extension of our commerce and power, may doubtless vie with any narration of this kind hitherto made public: Since as to the first of these heads, it may well be supposed that the general curiosity hath been strongly excited by the circumstances  
of

## INTRODUCTION.

of this undertaking already known to the world; for whether we consider the force of the Squadron sent on this service, or the diversified distresses that each single ship was separately involved in, or the uncommon instances of varying fortune, which attended the whole enterprize, each of these articles, I conceive, must, from its rude, well-known outlines, appear worthy of a compleater and more finished delineation: And if this be allowed with respect to the narrative part of the work, there can be no doubt about the more useful and instructive parts, which are almost every where interwoven with it; for I can venture to affirm, without fear of being contradicted on a comparison, that no voyage hitherto published, furnishes such a number of views of land, soundings, draughts of roads and ports, charts, and other materials, for the improvement of geography and navigation, as are contained in the ensuing volume; which are the more valuable too, as the greatest part of them relate to such Islands or Coasts, as have been hitherto not at all, or erroneously described, and where the want of sufficient and authentic information might occasion future enterprizes to prove abortive, perhaps with the destruction of the ships and men employed therein.

And besides the number and choice of these marine drawings and descriptions, there is another very essential circumstance belonging to them, which much enhances their worth; and that is, the great accuracy with which they were executed. I shall express my opinion of them in this particular very imperfectly, when I say, that they are not exceeded, and perhaps not equalled by any thing of this nature which hath as yet been communicated to the world: For they were not copied from the works of others, or composed at home from imperfect accounts, given by incurious and unskillful observers, (a practice too frequent in these matters) but the greatest part of them were delineated on the spot, with the utmost exactness, by the direction, and under the eye of Mr. Anson himself; and where (as is the case in three or four of them) they have been done by less skillful hands, or were found in possession of the enemy, and consequently their justness could be less relied on, I have always



## INTRODUCTION.

taken care to apprize the reader of it, and to put him on his guard against giving entire credit to them; although I doubt not, but these less authentic draughts, thus cautiously inserted, are to the full as correct as those, which are usually published on these occasions. For as actual surveys of roads and harbours, and nice and critical delineations of views of land, take up much time and attention, and require a good degree of skill both in planning and drawing, those who are defective in industry and ability, supply these wants by bold conjectures, and fictitious descriptions; and as they can be no otherwise confuted than by going on the spot, and running the risque of suffering by their misinformation, they have no apprehensions of being detected; and therefore, when they intrude their supposititious productions on the Public, they make no conscience of boasting at the same time, with how much skill and care they are performed. But let not those who are unacquainted with naval affairs imagine, that impositions of this kind are of an innocent nature; for as exact views of land are the surest guide to a seaman, on a coast where he has never been before, all fictions in so interesting a matter must be attended with numerous dangers, and sometimes with the destruction of those who are thus unhappily deceived.

Besides these draughts of such places as Mr. *Anson* or the ships under his command have touched at in the course of this expedition, and the descriptions and directions relating thereto, there is inserted, in the ensuing work, an ample account, with a chart annexed to it, of a particular navigation, of which hitherto little more than the name has been known, except to those immediately employed in it: I mean the track described by the *Manila* ship, in her passage to *Acapulco*, through the northern part of the *Pacific* Ocean. This material article is collected from the draughts and journals met with on board the *Manila* galeon, founded on the experience of more than a hundred and fifty years practice, and corroborated in its principal circumstances by the concurrent evidence of all the *Spanish* prisoners taken in that vessel. And as many of their journals, which I have examined, appear to have been not ill kept; I presume,

## • • INTRODUCTION.

sume, the chart of that northern Ocean, and the particulars of their route through it, may be very safely relied on by future Navigators. The advantages, which may be drawn from an exact knowledge of this navigation, and the beneficial projects that may be formed thereon, both in war and peace, are by no means proper to be discussed in this place: But they will easily offer themselves to the skilful in maritime affairs. However, as the *Manila* ships are the only ones which have ever traversed this vast ocean, except a *French* straggler or two, which have been afterwards seized on the coast of *Mexico*, and as during near two ages, in which this trade has been carried on, the *Spaniards* have, with the greatest care, secreted all accounts of their voyages from the rest of the world; these reasons alone would authorize the insertion of those papers, and would recommend them to the inquisitive, as a very great improvement in geography, and worthy of attention from the singularity of many circumstances therein recited. I must add too, (what in my opinion is far from being the least recommendation of these materials) that the observations of the variation of the compass in that Ocean, which are laid down in the chart, from these *Spanish* journals, tend greatly to complete the general system of the magnetic variation, of infinite import to the commercial and sea-faring part of mankind. These observations were, though in vain, often publicly called for by our learned countryman the late *Dr. Halley*, and to his immortal reputation they confirm, as far as they extend, the wonderful hypothesis he had entertained on this head, and very nearly correspond in their quantity, to the predictions he published above fifty years since, long before he was acquainted with any one observation made in those seas. The ascertaining the variation in that part of the world is just now too of more than ordinary consequence, as the Editors of a new variation-chart lately published, have, for want of proper information, been misled by an erroneous analogy, and have mistaken the very species of variation in that northern ocean; for they make it westerly where it is easterly, and have laid it down  $12^{\circ}$  or  $13^{\circ}$  different from its real quantity.

Thus

## INTRODUCTION.

Thus much it has been thought necessary to premise with regard to the hydrographical and geographical part of the ensuing work, which it is hoped the reader will, on perusal, find much ampler and more important than this slight sketch can well explain. But as there are hereafter occasionally interspersed some accounts of *Spanish* transactions, and many observations relating to the disposition of the *American Spaniards*, and to the condition of the countries bordering on the *South-Seas*, and as herein I may appear to differ greatly from the opinions generally established; I think it behoves me particularly to recite the authorities I have been guided by in these matters, that I may not be censured, as having given way either to a thoughtless credulity on one hand, or, what would be a much more criminal imputation, to a wilful and deliberate misrepresentation on the other.

Mr. Anson, before he set sail upon this expedition, besides the printed journals to those parts, took care to furnish himself with the best manuscript accounts he could procure of all the *Spanish* settlements upon the coasts of *Chili*, *Peru* and *Mexico*: These he carefully compared with the examinations of his prisoners, and the informations of several intelligent persons, who fell into his hands in the *South-Seas*. He had likewise the good fortune, in some of his captures, to possess himself of a great number of letters and papers of a public nature, many of them written by the Viceroy of *Peru* to the Viceroy of *Santa Fee*, to the Presidents of *Panama* and *Chili*, to Don *Blas de Lezo*, Admiral of the galeons, and to divers other persons in considerable employments; and in these letters there was usually inserted a recital of those they were intended to answer; so that they contained no small part of the correspondence between those officers for some time previous to our arrival on that coast: We took, besides many letters sent from persons intrusted by the *Spanish* Government to their friends and correspondents, which were frequently filled with narrations of public business, and sometimes contained undisguised animadversions on the views and conduct of their superiors. From these materials

## INTRODUCTION.

those accounts of the *Spanish* affairs are drawn, which may at first sight appear the most exceptionable. In particular, the history of the various casualties, which befel *Pizarro's* squadron, is for the most part composed from intercepted letters. Though indeed the relation of the insurrection of *Orellana* and his followers, is founded on rather a less disputable authority: For it was taken from the mouth of an *English* Gentleman then on board *Pizarro*, who often conversed with *Orellana*; and it was, upon enquiry, confirmed in its principal circumstances by others who were in the ship at the same time: So that the fact, however extraordinary, is, I conceive, not to be contested.

And on this occasion I cannot but mention, that though I have endeavoured, with my utmost care, to adhere strictly to truth in every article of the ensuing narration; yet I am apprehensive, that in so complicated a work, some oversights must have been committed, by the inattention to which at times all mankind are liable. However, I am as yet conscious of none but literal and insignificant mistakes: And if there are others more considerable, which have escaped me; I flatter myself they are not of moment enough to affect any material transaction, and therefore I hope they may justly claim the readers indulgence.

After this general account of the ensuing work, it might be expected, perhaps, that I should proceed to the work itself, but I cannot finish this Introduction, without adding a few reflexions on a matter very nearly connected with the present subject; and, as I conceive, neither destitute of utility, nor unworthy the attention of the Public; I mean, the animating my countrymen both in their public and private stations, to the encouragement and pursuit of all kinds of geographical and nautical observations, and of every species of mechanical and commercial information. It is by a settled attachment to these seemingly minute particulars, that our ambitious neighbours have established some part of that power, with which we are now struggling: And as we have the means in our hands of pursuing these subjects more effectually, than they  
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## INTRODUCTION.

can, it would be a dishonour to us longer to neglect so easy and beneficial a practice. For, as we have a navy much more numerous than theirs, great part of which is always employed in very distant stations, either in the protection of our colonies and commerce, or in assisting our allies against the common enemy; this gives us frequent opportunities of furnishing ourselves with such kind of materials, as are here recommended, and such as might turn greatly to our advantage either in war or peace. Since, not to mention what might be expected from the officers of the Navy, if their application to these subjects was properly encouraged, it would create no new expence to the Government to establish a particular regulation for this purpose; as all that would be requisite, would be constantly to embark on board some of our men of war, which are sent on these distant cruises, a person, who with the character of an engineer, and the skill and talents necessary to that profession, should be employed in drawing such coasts, and planning such harbours, as the ship should touch at, and in making such other observations of all kinds, as might either prove of advantage to future Navigators, or might any ways tend to promote the Public service. Persons habituated to these operations (which could not fail at the same time of improving them in their proper business) would be extremely useful in many other lights, besides those already mentioned, and might tend to secure our Fleets from those disgraces, with which their attempts against places on shore have been often attended. And, in a Nation like ours, where all sciences are more eagerly and universally pursued, and better understood than in any other part of the world; proper subjects for these employments could not long be wanting, if due encouragement were given to them. This method here recommended is known to have been frequently practised by the *French*; particularly in the instance of Monsieur *Frezier*, an Engineer, who has published a celebrated voyage to the *South-Seas*: For this person, in the year 1711, was purposely sent by the *French* King into that country on board a merchantman, that he might examine and describe the

## INTRODUCTION.

coast, and take plans of all the fortified places; the better to enable the *French* to prosecute their illicit trade, or, on a rupture between them and the court of *Spain*, to form their enterprizes in those seas with more readiness and certainty. Should we pursue this method, we might hope, that the emulation amongst those who were commissioned for these undertakings, and the experience, which even in the most peaceable intervals, they would hereby acquire, might at length procure us a proper number of able Engineers, and might efface the national scandal, which our deficiency in that species of men has some times exposed us to: And surely, every step to encourage and improve them, is of great moment to the Public; as no persons, when they are properly instructed, make better returns in war, for the distinctions and emoluments bestowed on them in time of peace. Of which the advantages the *French* have reaped from their dexterity (too numerous and recent to be soon forgot) are an ample confirmation.

And having mentioned Engineers, or such as are skilled in drawing, and the other usual practices of that profession, as the properest persons to be employed in these foreign enquiries, I cannot (as it offers itself so naturally to the subject in hand) but lament, how very imperfect many of our accounts of distant countries are rendered by the relators being unskilled in drawing, and in the general principles of surveying; even where other abilities have not been wanting. Had more of our travellers been initiated in these acquirements, and had there been added thereto some little skill in the common astronomical observations, (all which a person of ordinary talents might attain, with a very moderate share of application) we should by this time have seen the geography of the globe much correcter, than we now find it; the dangers of navigation would have been considerably lessened, and the manners, arts and produce of foreign countries would have been better known to us, than they are. Indeed, when I consider, the strong incitements that all travellers have to pursue some part at least of these qualifications, especially drawing; when I consider

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## INTRODUCTION.

how much it would facilitate their observations, assist and strengthen their memories, and of how tedious, and often unintelligible, a load of description it would rid them; I cannot but wonder that any person, who intends to visit distant countries, with a view of informing either himself or others, should be wanting in so necessary a piece of skill. And to enforce this argument still further, I must add, that besides the uses of drawing, already mentioned, there is one, which, though not so obvious, is yet perhaps of more consequence than all that has been hitherto urged; I mean the strength and distinguishing power it adds to some of our faculties. This appears from hence, that those who are used to draw objects, observe them with more accuracy, than others who are not habituated to that practice. For we may easily find, by a little experience, that when we view any object, however simple, our attention or memory is scarcely at any time so strong as to enable us, when we have turned our eyes away from it, to recollect exactly every part it consisted of, and to recall all the circumstances of its appearance; since, on examination, it will be discovered, that in some we were mistaken, and others we had totally overlooked: But he that is accustomed to draw what he sees, is at the same time accustomed to rectify this inattention; for by confronting his ideas copied on the paper, with the object he intends to represent, he finds out what circumstance has deceived him in its appearance; and hence he at length acquires the habit of observing much more at one view, and retains what he sees with more correctness than he could ever have done, without his practice and proficiency in drawing.

If what has been said merits the attention of Travellers of all sorts, it is, I think, more particularly applicable to the Gentlemen of the Navy; since, without drawing and planning, neither charts nor views of land can be taken; and without these it is sufficiently evident, that navigation is at a full stand. It is doubtless from a persuasion of the utility of these qualifications, that his Majesty has established a Drawing-master at *Portsmouth*, for the instruction of those, who are presumed to be hereafter intrusted with the com-

## · I N T R O D U C T I O N .

mand of his Royal Navy : And though some have been so far misled, as to suppose, that the perfection of Sea-officers consisted in a turn of mind and temper resembling the boisterous element they had to deal with, and have condemned all literature and science as effeminate, and derogatory to that ferocity, which, they would falsely persuade us, was the most unerring characteristic of courage : Yet it is to be hoped, that such absurdities as these have at no time been authorised by the Public opinion, and that the belief of them daily diminishes. If those who adhere to these mischievous positions were capable of being influenced by reason, or swayed by example, I should think it sufficient for their conviction, to observe, that the most valuable drawings inserted in the following work, though done with such a degree of skill, that even professed artists can with difficulty imitate them, were taken by Mr. *Piercy Brett*, one of Mr. *Anson's* Lieutenants, and since Captain of the *Lion* man of war ; who, in his memorable engagement with the *Elizabeth* (for the importance of the service, or the resolution with which it was conducted, inferior to none this age has seen) has given ample proof, that a proficiency in the arts I have been here recommending is extremely consistent with the most exemplary bravery, and the most distinguished skill in every function belonging to the duty of a Sea-officer. Indeed, when the many branches of science are attended to, of which even the common practice of navigation is composed, and the many improvements, which men of skill have added to this practice within these few years, it would induce one to believe, that the advantages of reflection and speculative knowledge were in no profession more eminent than in that of a Sea-officer : For, not to mention some expertness in geography, geometry and astronomy, which it would be dishonourable for him to be without, (as his journal and his estimate of the daily position of the ship are founded on particular branches of these arts) it may be well supposed, that the management and working of a ship, the discovery of her most eligible position in the water, (usually styled her Trim) and the disposition.



## INTRODUCTION.

disposition of her sails in the most advantageous manner, are articles, wherein the knowledge of mechanics cannot but be greatly assistant. And perhaps the application of this kind of knowledge to naval subjects may produce as great improvements in sailing and working a ship, as it has already done in many other matters conducive to the ease and convenience of human life. Since, when the fabric of a ship, and the variety of her sails are considered, together with the artificial contrivances for adapting them to her different motions, as it cannot be doubted, but these things have been brought about by more than ordinary sagacity and invention, so neither can it be doubted, but that, in some conjunctures, a speculative and scientific turn of mind may find out the means of directing and disposing this complicated mechanism much more advantageously than can be done by mere habit, or by a servile copying of what others may perhaps have erroneously practised in similar emergencies. But it is time to finish this digression, and to leave the reader to the perusal of the ensuing work; which, with how little art soever it may be executed, will yet, from the importance of the subject, and the utility and excellence of the materials, merit some share of the Public attention.

## A VOYAGE



A  
V O Y A G E  
R O U N D T H E  
W O R L D,

B Y

GEORGE ANSON, Esq;  
Now LORD ANSON,

Commander in Chief of a Squadron of his  
MAJESTY's Ships.

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B O O K I.

C H A P. I.

Of the equipment of the squadron: The incidents relating thereto, from its first appointment, to its setting sail from St. *Helens*.

**T**HE squadron under the Command of Mr. *Anson* (of which I here propose to recite the most material proceedings) having undergone many changes in its destination, its force, and its equipment, during the ten months between its original appointment and its final sailing from St. *Helens*; I conceive the history of these alterations is a detail necessary to be made public, both for the honour of those who first planned and promoted this enterprize, and for the justification of those who have been entrusted

trusted with its execution. Since it will from hence appear, that the accidents the expedition was afterwards exposed to, and which prevented it from producing all the natural advantages the strength of the squadron, and the expectation of the public, seemed to preface, were principally owing to a series of interruptions, which delayed the Commander in the course of his preparations, and which it exceeded his utmost industry either to avoid or to get removed.

When in the latter end of the summer of the year 1739, it was foreseen that a war with *Spain* was inevitable, it was the opinion of some considerable persons then trusted with the administration of affairs, that the most prudent step the Nation could take, on the breaking out of the war, was attacking that Crown in her distant settlements; for by this means (as at that time there was the greatest probability of success) it was supposed that we should cut off the principal resources of the enemy, and should reduce them to the necessity of sincerely desiring a peace, as they would hereby be deprived of the returns of that treasure by which alone they could be enabled to carry on a war.

In pursuance of these sentiments, several projects were examined, and several resolutions were taken by the Council. And in all these deliberations it was from the first determined, that *George Anson*, Esq; then Captain of the *Centurion*, should be employed as Commander in Chief of an expedition of this kind: And he at that time being absent on a cruise, a vessel was dispatched to his station so early as the beginning of *September*, to order him to return with his ship to *Portsmouth*. And soon after he came there, that is, on the 10th of *November* following, he received a letter from Sir *Charles Wager*, directing him to repair to *London*, and to attend the board of Admiralty: Where, when he arrived, he was informed by Sir *Charles*, that two Squadrons would be immediately fitted out for two secret expeditions, which however would have some connexion with each other: That he, Mr. *Anson*, was intended to command one of them, and Mr. *Cornwall* (who hath since lost his life gloriously in the defence of his country's honour) the other:

That the Squadron under Mr. *Anson* was to take on board three Independent Companies of a hundred men each, and *Bland's* regiment of Foot : That Colonel *Bland* was likewise to embark with his regiment, and to command the land-forces : And that, as soon as this Squadron could be fitted for the sea, they were to set sail, with express orders to touch at no place till they came to *Java Head* in the *East-Indies* : That there they were only to stop to take in water, and thence to proceed directly to the city of *Manila*, situated on *Luconia*, one of the *Philippine* Islands : That the other Squadron was to be of equal force with this commanded by Mr. *Anson*, and was intended to pass round *Cape Horn* into the *South-Seas*, to range along that coast ; and after cruising upon the enemy in those parts, and attempting their settlements, this Squadron in its return was to rendezvous at *Manila*, there to join the Squadron under Mr. *Anson*, where they were to refresh their men, and refit their ships, and perhaps receive orders for other considerable enterprizes.

This scheme was doubtless extremely well projected, and could not but greatly advance the Public Service, and the reputation and fortune of those concerned in its execution ; for had Mr. *Anson* proceeded for *Manila* at the time and in the manner proposed by Sir *Charles Wager*, he would, in all probability, have arrived there before they had received any advice of the war between us and *Spain*, and consequently before they had been in the least prepared for the reception of an enemy, or had any apprehensions of their danger. The city of *Manila* might well be supposed to have been at that time in the same defenceless condition with all the other *Spanish* settlements, just at the breaking out of the war : That is to say, their fortifications neglected, and in many places decayed ; their cannon dismounted, or rendered useless by the mouldring of their carriages ; their magazines, whether of military stores or provision, all empty ; their garrisons unpaid, and consequently thin, ill-affected, and dispirited ; and the royal chests in *Peru*, whence alone all these disorders could receive their redress, drained to the very bottom : This, from the intercepted letters of their Viceroy's

and Governors, is well known to have been the defenceless state of *Panama*, and the other *Spanish* places on the coast of the *South-Sea*, for near a twelvemonth after our declaration of war. And it cannot be supposed that the city of *Manila*, removed still farther by almost half the circumference of the globe, should have experienced from the *Spanish* Government, a greater share of attention and concern for its security, than *Panama*, and the other important ports in *Peru* and *Chili*, on which their possession of that immense Empire depends. Indeed, it is well known, that *Manila* was at that time incapable of making any considerable defence, and in all probability would have surrendered only on the appearance of our squadron before it. The consequence of this city, and the island it stands on, may be in some measure estimated, from the known healthiness of its air, the excellency of its port and bay, the number and wealth of its inhabitants, and the very extensive and beneficial commerce which it carries on to the principal Ports in the *East-Indies*, and *China*, and its exclusive trade to *Acapulco*, the returns for which, being made in silver, are, upon the lowest valuation, not less than three millions of Dollars *per annum*.

On this Scheme Sir *Charles Wager* was so intent, that in a few days after this first conference, that is, on *November* 18, Mr. *Anson* received an order to take under his command the *Argyle*, *Severn*, *Pearl*, *Wager*, and *Tryal Ship*; and other orders were issued to him in the same month, and in the *December* following, relating to the victualling of this squadron. But Mr. *Anson* attending the Admiralty the beginning of *January*, he was informed by Sir *Charles Wager*, that for reasons with which he, Sir *Charles*, was not acquainted, the expedition to *Manila* was laid aside. It may be conceived, that Mr. *Anson* was extremely chagrined at the losing the command of so infallible, so honourable, and in every respect, so desirable an enterprize, especially too as he had already, at a very great expence, made the necessary provision for his own accommodation in this voyage, which he had reason to expect would prove a very long one. However, Sir *Charles*, to render this disappointment

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in some degree more tolerable, informed him that the expedition to the *South-Seas* was still intended, and that he, Mr. *Anson*, and his squadron, as their first destination was now countermanded, should be employed in that service. And on the 10th of *January* he received his commission, appointing him Commander in chief of the forementioned squadron, (which the *Argyle* being in the course of their preparation changed for the *Gloucester*) was the same he sailed with above eight months after from *St. Helens*. On this change of destination, the equipment of the squadron was still prosecuted with as much vigour as ever, and the victualling, and whatever depended on the Commodore, was soon so far advanced, that he conceived the ships might be capable of putting to sea the instant he should receive his final orders, of which he was in daily expectation. And at last, on the 28th of *June* 1740, the Duke of *Newcastle*, Principal Secretary of State, delivered to him his Majesty's instructions, dated *January* 31, 1739, with an additional instruction from the Lords Justices, dated *June* 19, 1740. On the receipt of these, Mr. *Anson* immediately repaired to *Spithead*, with a resolution to sail with the first fair wind, flattering himself that all his difficulties were now at an end. For though he knew by the musters that his squadron wanted three hundred seamen of their complement, (a deficiency, which, with all his assiduity, he had not been able to get supplied) yet, as Sir *Charles Wager* informed him, that an order from the board of Admiralty was dispatched to Sir *John Norris*, to spare him the numbers which he wanted, he doubted not of its being complied with. But on his arrival at *Portsmouth*, he found himself greatly mistaken, and disappointed in this persuasion; for on his application, Sir *John Norris* told him, he could spare him none, for he wanted men for his own fleet. This occasioned an inevitable and a very considerable delay; for it was the end of *July* before this deficiency was by any means supplied, and all that was then done was extremely short of his necessities and expectation. For Admiral *Balchen*, who succeeded to the command at *Spithead*, after Sir *John Norris* had sailed to the west-

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ward, instead of three hundred able sailors, which Mr. *Anson* wanted of his complement, ordered on board the squadron a hundred and seventy men only ; of which thirty-two were from the hospital and sick quarters, thirty-seven from the *Salisbury*, with three officers of Colonel *Lowther's* regiment, and ninety-eight marines, and these were all that ever were granted to make up the forementioned deficiency.

But the Commodore's mortification did not end here. It has been already observed, that it was at first intended that Colonel *Bland's* regiment, and three independent companies of a hundred men each, should embark as land-forces on board the squadron. But this disposition was now changed, and all the land-forces that were to be allowed, were five hundred invalids to be collected from the out-pensioners of *Chelsea* college. As these out-pensioners consist of soldiers, who from their age, wounds, or other infirmities, are incapable of service in marching regiments, Mr. *Anson* was greatly chagrined at having such a decrepid detachment allotted him ; for he was fully persuaded that the greatest part of them would perish long before they arrived at the scene of action, since the delays he had already encountered, necessarily confined his passage round *Cape Horn* the most rigorous season of the year. Sir *Charles Wager* too joined in opinion with the Commodore, that invalids were no way proper for this service, and solicited strenuously to have them exchanged ; but he was told, that persons, who were supposed to be better judges of soldiers than he or Mr. *Anson*, thought them the properest men that could be employed on this occasion. And upon this determination they were ordered on board the squadron on the 5th of *August* : But instead of five hundred, there came on board no more than two hundred and fifty-nine ; for all those who had limbs and strength to walk out of *Portsmouth* deserted, leaving behind them only such as were literally invalids, most of them being sixty years of age, and some of them upwards of seventy. Indeed it is difficult to conceive a more moving scene than the embarkation of these unhappy veterans : They were them-

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selves extremely averse to the service they were engaged in, and fully apprised of all the disasters they were afterwards exposed to; the apprehensions of which were strongly mark'd by the concern that appeared in their countenances, which was mixed with no small degree of indignation, to be thus hurried from their repose into a fatiguing employ, to which neither the strength of their bodies, nor the vigour of their minds, were any way proportioned, and where, without seeing the face of an enemy; or in the least promoting the success of the enterprize, they would in all probability uselessly perish by lingering and painful diseases; and this too, after they had spent the activity and strength of their youth in their Country's service.

I cannot but observe, on this melancholy incident, how extremely unfortunate it was, both to this aged and diseased detachment, and to the expedition they were employed in; that amongst all the out-pensioners of *Chelsea* Hospital, which were supposed to amount to two thousand men, the most crazy and infirm only should be culled out for so laborious and perilous an undertaking. For it was well known, that however unfit, invalids in general might be for this service, yet by a prudent choice, there might have been found amongst them five hundred men who had some remains of vigour left: And Mr. *Anson* fully expected, that the best of them would have been allotted him; whereas the whole detachment that was sent to him, seemed to be made up of the most decrepid and miserable objects, that could be collected out of the whole body; and by the desertion abovementioned, these were a second time cleared of that little health and strength which were to be found amongst them, and he was to take up with such as were much fitter for an infirmary, than for any military duty.

And here it is necessary to mention another material particular in the equipment of this Squadron. It was proposed to Mr. *Anson*, after it was resolved that he should be sent to the *South-Seas*, to take with him two persons under the denomination of Agent Victuallers. Those who were mentioned for this employment had formerly been  
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in the *Spanish West Indies*, in the *South-Sea Company's* service, and it was supposed that by their knowledge and intelligence on that coast, they might often procure provisions for him by compact with the inhabitants, when it was not to be got by force of arms : These Agent Victuallers were, for this purpose, to be allowed to carry to the value of 15,000*l.* in merchandise on board the squadron ; for they had represented, that it would be much easier for them to procure provisions with goods, than with the value of the same goods in money. Whatever colours were given to this scheme, it was difficult to persuade the generality of mankind, that it was not principally intended for the enrichment of the Agents, by the beneficial commerce they proposed to carry on upon that coast. Mr. *Anson*, from the beginning, objected both to the appointment of Agent Victuallers, and the allowing them to carry a cargo on board the squadron : For he conceived, that in those few amicable ports where the squadron might touch, he needed not their assistance to contract for any provisions the place afforded ; and on the enemy's coast, he did not imagine that they could ever procure him the necessaries he should want, unless (which he was resolved not to comply with) the military operations of his squadron were to be regulated by the ridiculous views of their trading projects. All that he thought the Government ought to have done on this occasion, was to put on board to the value of 2 or 3000*l.* only of such goods, as the *Indians*, or the *Spanish* Planters in the less cultivated part of the coast, might be tempted with ; since it was in such places only that he imagined it would be worth while to truck with the enemy for provisions : And in these places it was sufficiently evident, a very small cargo would suffice.

But though the Commodore objected both to the appointment of these officers, and to their project, of the success of which he had no opinion ; yet, as they had insinuated that their scheme, besides victualling the squadron, might contribute to settling a trade upon that coast, which might be afterwards carried on without difficulty, and might thereby prove a very considerable national advantage, they were much listened to by some considerable

derable persons : And of the 15,000 *l.* which was to be the amount of their cargo, the Government agreed to advance them 10,000 upon imprest, and the remaining 5000 they raised on bottomry bonds ; and the goods purchased with this sum, were all that were taken to sea by the Squadron, how much soever the amount of them might be afterwards magnified by common report.

This cargo was at first shipped on board the *Wager* Store Ship, and one of the Victuallers ; no part of it being admitted on board the men of war. But when the Commodore was at *St. Catharine's*, he considered, that in case the Squadron should be separated, it might be pretended that some of the ships were disappointed of provisions for want of a cargo to truck with, and therefore he distributed some of the least bulky commodities on board the men of war, leaving the remainder principally on board the *Wager*, where it was lost : And more of the goods perishing by various accidents to be recited hereafter, and no part of them being disposed of upon the coast, the few that came home to *England*, did not produce, when sold, above a fourth part of the original price. So true was the Commodore's judgment of the event of this project, which had been by many considered as infallibly productive of immense gains. But to return to the transactions at *Portsmouth*.

To supply the place of the two hundred and forty invalids which had deserted, as is mentioned above, there were ordered on board two hundred and ten marines detached from different regiments : These were raw and undisciplined men, for they were just raised, and had scarcely any thing more of the soldier than their regimentals, none of them having been so far trained, as to be permitted to fire. The last detachment of these marines came on board the 8th of *August*, and on the 10th the Squadron sailed from *Spithead* to *St. Helens*, there to wait for a wind to proceed on the expedition.

But the delays we had already suffered had not yet spent all their influence, for we were now advanced into a season of the year, when the westerly winds are usually very constant, and very violent ; and it was thought proper that we should put to sea in com-

pany with the fleet commanded by Admiral *Balchen*, and the expedition under Lord *Catcart*. As we made up in all twenty-one men of war, and a hundred and twenty-four sail of merchantmen and transports, we had no hopes of getting out of the Channel with so large a number of ships, without the continuance of a fair wind, for some considerable time. This was what we had every day less and less reason to expect, as the time of the equinox drew near; so that our golden dreams, and our ideal possession of the *Peruvian* treasures, grew each day more faint, and the difficulties and dangers of the passage round Cape *Horn* in the winter season filled our imaginations in their room. For it was forty days from our arrival at St. *Helens*, to our final departure from thence: And even then (having orders to proceed without Lord *Catcart*) we tided it down the Channel with a contrary wind. But this interval of forty days was not free from the displeasing fatigue of often setting sail, and being as often obliged to return; nor exempt from dangers, greater than have been sometimes undergone in surrounding the globe. For the wind coming fair for the first time, on the 23d of *August*, we got under sail, and Admiral *Balchen* shewed himself truly solicitous to have proceeded to sea, but the wind soon returning to its old quarter, obliged us to put back to St. *Helens*, not without considerable hazard, and some damage received by two of the transports, who, in tacking, ran foul of each other. Besides this, we made two or three more attempts to sail, but without any better success. And, on the 6th of *September*, being returned to an anchor at St. *Helens*, after one of these fruitless efforts, the wind blew so fresh, that the whole fleet struck their yards and topmasts to prevent driving: Yet, notwithstanding this precaution, the *Centurion* drove the next evening, and brought both cables a-head, and we were in no small danger of driving foul of the Prince *Frederick*, a seventy-gun ship, moored at a small distance under our stern; though we happily escaped, by her driving at the same time; and so preserving her distance: But we did not think ourselves secure, till we at last let go the sheet anchor, which fortunately brought us up.

However, on the 9th of *September*, we were in some degree relieved from this lingering vexatious situation, by an Order which Mr. *Anson* received from the Lords Justices, to put to sea the first opportunity with his own Squadron only, if Lord *Catbcart* should not be ready. Being thus freed from the troublesome company of so large a fleet, our Commodore resolved to weigh and tide it down the Channel, as soon as the weather should become sufficiently moderate; and this might easily have been done with our own Squadron alone full two months sooner, had the orders of the Admiralty, for supplying us with seamen, been punctually complied with, and had we met with none of those other delays mentioned in this narration. It is true, our hopes of a speedy departure were even now somewhat damped, by a subsequent order which Mr. *Anson* received on the 12th of *September*; for by that he was required to take under his convoy the *St. Albans* with the *Turkey* fleet, and to join the *Dragon* and the *Winchester*, with the *Streights* and the *American* trade at *Torbay* or *Plymouth*, and to proceed with them to sea as far as their way and ours lay together: This incumbrance of a convoy gave us some uneasiness, as we feared it might prove the means of lengthening our passage to the *Maderas*. However, Mr. *Anson*, now having the command himself, resolved to adhere to his former determination, and to tide it down the Channel with the first moderate weather; and that the junction of his Convoy might occasion as little loss of time as possible, he immediately sent directions to *Torbay*, that the fleets he was there to take under his care, might be in a readiness to join him instantly on his approach. And at last, on the 18th of *September*, he weighed from *St. Helens*; and though the wind was at first contrary, had the good fortune to get clear of the Channel in four days, as will be more particularly related in the ensuing chapter.

Having thus gone through the respective steps taken in the equipment of this Squadron, it is sufficiently obvious how different an aspect this expedition bore at its first appointment in the beginning of

*January*, from what it had in the latter end of *September*, when it left the Channel ; and how much its numbers, its strength, and the probability of its success were diminished, by the various incidents which took place in that interval. For instead of having all our old and ordinary seamen exchanged for such as were young and able, (which the Commodore was at first promised) and having our numbers compleated to their full complement, we were obliged to retain our first crews, which were very indifferent ; and a deficiency of three hundred men in our numbers was no otherwise made up to us, than by sending us on board a hundred and seventy men, the greatest part composed of such as were discharged from hospitals, or new-raised marines who had never been at sea before. And in the land-forces allotted us, the change was still more disadvantageous ; for there, instead of three independent companies of a hundred men each, and *Bland's* regiment of foot, which was an old one, we had only four hundred and seventy invalids and marines, one part of them incapable of action by their age and infirmities, and the other part useless by their ignorance of their duty. But the diminishing the strength of the Squadron was not the greatest inconvenience which attended these alterations ; for the contests, representations, and difficulties which they continually produced, (as we have above seen, that in these cases the authority of the Admiralty was not always submitted to) occasioned a delay and waste of time, which in its consequences was the source of all the disasters to which this enterprize was afterwards exposed : For by this means we were obliged to make our passage round *Cape Horn* in the most tempestuous season of the year ; whence proceeded the separation of our Squadron, the loss of numbers of our men, and the imminent hazard of our total destruction. By this delay too, the enemy had been so well informed of our designs, that a person who had been employed in the *South-Sea Company's* service, and arrived from *Panama* three or four days before we left *Portsmouth*, was able to relate to Mr. *Anson* most of the particulars

ticulars of the destination and strength of our squadron, from what he had learned amongst the *Spaniards* before he left them. And this was afterwards confirmed by a more extraordinary circumstance : For we shall find, that when the *Spaniards* (fully satisfied that our expedition was intended for the *South-Seas*) had fitted out a squadron to oppose us, which had so far got the start of us, as to arrive before us off the island of *Madera*, the Commander of this squadron was so well instructed in the form and make of Mr. *Anson's* broad pendant, and had imitated it so exactly, that he thereby decoyed the *Pearl*, one of our squadron, within gun-shot of him, before the Captain of the *Pearl* was able to discover his mistake.

## C H A P. II.

The passage from St. *Helens* to the Island of *Madera* ;  
with a short account of that Island, and of our  
stay there.

ON the 18th of *September*, 1740, the Squadron, as we have observed in the preceeding chapter, weighed from St. *Helens* with a contrary wind, the Commodore proposing to tide it down the Channel, as he dreaded less the inconveniences he should thereby have to struggle with, than the risk he should run of ruining the enterprize, by an uncertain, and, in all probability, a tedious attendance for a fair wind.

The Squadron allotted to this service consisted of five men of war, a sloop of war, and two victualling ships. They were the *Centurion* of sixty guns, four hundred men, *George Anson*, Esq; Commander ; the *Gloucester* of fifty guns, three hundred men, *Richard Norris* Commander ; the *Severn* of fifty guns, three hundred men, the Honourable *Edward Legg* Commander ; the *Pearl* of forty guns, two hundred and fifty men, *Matthew Mitchel* Commander ; the *Wager* of twenty-eight guns, one hundred and sixty men, *Dandy Kidd* Commander ; and the *Tryal* Sloop of eight guns, one hundred men, the Honourable *John Murray* Commander ; the two victuallers were Pinks, the largest of about four hundred, and the other of about two hundred tons burthen, these were to attend us, till the provisions we had taken on board were so far consumed, as to make room for the additional quantity they carried with them, which, when we had taken into our ships, they were to be discharged. Besides the complement of men born by the abovementioned ships as their crews, there were embarked on board the Squadron about four hundred and seventy invalids and marines,  
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under the denomination of land-forces, (as has been particularly mentioned in the preceeding chapter) which were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel *Crackerode*. With this squadron, together with the *St. Albans* and the *Lark*, and the trade under their convoy, Mr. *Anson*, after weighing from *St. Helens*, tided it down the Channel for the first forty-eight-hours; and, on the 20th, in the morning, we discovered off the *Ram-Head*, the *Dragon*, *Winchester*, *South-Sea Castle*, and *Rye*, with a number of merchantmen under their convoy: These we joined about noon the same day, our Commodore having orders to see them (together with the *St. Albans* and *Lark*) as far into the sea as their course and ours lay together. When we came in sight of this last mentioned fleet, Mr. *Anson* first hoisted his broad pendant, and was saluted by all the men of war in company.

When we had joined this last Convoy, we made up eleven men of war, and about one hundred and fifty sail of merchantmen, consisting of the *Turkey*, the *Streights*, and the *American* trade. Mr. *Anson*, the same day, made a signal for all the Captains of the men of war to come on board him, where he delivered them their fighting and sailing instructions, and then with a fair wind we all stood towards the South-West; and the next day at noon, being the 21st, we had run forty leagues from the *Ram-Head*. Being now clear of the land, our Commodore, to render our view more extensive, ordered Captain *Mitchel*, in the *Pearl*, to make sail two leagues a-head of the fleet every morning, and to repair to his station every evening. Thus we proceeded till the 25th, when the *Winchester* and the *American* Convoy made the concerted signal for leave to separate, which being answered by the Commodore, they left us: As the *St. Albans* and the *Dragon*, with the *Turkey* and *Streights* Convoy, did on the 29th. After which separation, there remained in company only our own squadron and our two victuallers, with which we kept on our course for the Island of *Madera*. But the winds were so contrary, that we had the mortification to be forty days in our passage thither from *St. Helens*, though it is known to be often  
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done in ten or twelve. This delay was a most unpleasing circumstance, productive of much discontent and ill-humour amongst our people, of which those only can have a tolerable idea, who have had the experience of a like situation. For besides the peevishness and despondency which foul and contrary winds, and a lingering voyage never fail to create on all occasions, we, in particular, had very substantial reasons to be greatly alarmed at this unexpected impediment. Since as we had departed from *England* much later than we ought to have done, we had placed almost all our hopes of success in the chance of retrieving in some measure at sea, the time we had so unhappily wasted at *Spithead* and *St. Helens*. However, at last, on *Monday, October* the 25th, at five in the morning, we, to our great joy, made the land, and in the afternoon came to an anchor in *Madera Road*, in forty fathom water; the *Brazen-Head* bearing from us E by S, the *Loo* NNW, and the great Church NNE. We had hardly let go our anchor, when an *English* privateer sloop ran under our stern, and saluted the Commodore with nine guns, which we returned with five. And, the next day, the Consul of the Island visiting the Commodore, we saluted him with nine guns on his coming on board.

This Island of *Madera*, where we are now arrived, is famous through all our *American* settlements for its excellent wines, which seem to be designed by Providence for the refreshment of the inhabitants of the Torrid Zone. It is situated in a fine climate, in the latitude of 32: 27 North; and in the longitude from *London* (by our different reckonings,) of  $18^{\circ} \frac{1}{2}$  to  $19^{\circ} \frac{1}{2}$  West, though laid down in the charts in  $17^{\circ}$ . It is composed of one continued hill, of a considerable height, extending itself from East to West: The declivity of which, on the South-side, is cultivated and interspersed with vineyards; and in the midst of this slope the Merchants have fixed their country seats, which help to form a very agreeable prospect. There is but one considerable town in the whole Island, it is named *Fonchiule*, and is seated on the South part of the Island, at the bot-  
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tom of a large bay. Towards the sea, it is defended by a high wall, with a battery of cannon, besides a castle on the *Loo*, which is a rock standing in the water at a small distance from the shore. *Fonchiale* is the only place of trade, and indeed, the only place where it is possible for a boat to land. And even here the beach is covered with large stones, and a violent surf continually beats upon it; so that the Commodore did not care to venture the ships long boats to fetch the water off, there was so much danger of their being lost; and therefore ordered the Captains of the Squadron to employ *Portuguese* boats on that service.

We continued about a week at this Island, watering our ships, and providing the Squadron with wine and other refreshments. Here on the 3d of *November*, Captain *Richard Norris* signified by a letter to the Commodore, his desire to quit his command on board the *Gloucester*, in order to return to *England* for the recovery of his health, this request the Commodore complied with; and thereupon was pleased to appoint Captain *Matthew Mitchell* to command the *Gloucester* in his room, and to remove Captain *Kidd* from the *Wager* to the *Pearl*, and Captain *Murray* from the *Tryal* Sloop to the *Wager*, giving the command of the *Tryal* to Lieutenant *Cheap*. These promotions being settled, with other changes in the Lieutenancies, the Commodore, on the following day, gave to the Captains their orders, appointing *St. Jago*, one of the *Cape de Verd* Islands, to be the first place of rendezvous in case of separation; and directing them, if they did not meet the *Centurion* there, to make the best of their way to the Island of *St. Catherine's*, on the coast of *Brazil*. The water for the Squadron being the same day compleated, and each ship supplied with as much wine and other refreshments as they could take in, we weighed anchor in the afternoon, and took our leave of the Island of *Madera*. But before I go on with the narration of our own transactions, I think it necessary to give some account of the proceedings of the enemy, and of the measures they had taken to render all our designs abortive.

When Mr. *Anfon* visited the Governor of *Madera*, he received information from him, that for three or four days, in the latter end of *October*, there had appeared, to the westward of that Island, seven or eight ships of the line, and a *Patache*, which kept was sent every day close in to make the land. The Governor assured the Commodore, upon his honour, that none upon the Island had either given them intelligence, or had in any sort communicated with them, but that he believed them to be either *French* or *Spanish*, but was rather inclined to think them *Spanish*. On this intelligence, Mr. *Anfon* sent an Officer in a clean sloop, eight leagues to the westward, to reconnoitre them, and, if possible, to discover what they were: But the Officer returned without being able to get a sight of them, so that we still remained in uncertainty. However, we could not but conjecture, that this fleet was intended to put a stop to our expedition, which, had they cruised to the eastward of the Island instead of the westward, they could not but have executed with great facility. For as, in that case, they must have certainly fallen in with us, we should have been obliged to throw overboard vast quantities of provision to clear our ships for an engagement, and this alone, without any regard to the event of the action, would have effectually prevented our progress. This was so obvious a measure, that we could not help imagining reasons which might have prevented them from pursuing it. And we therefore supposed, that this *French* or *Spanish* squadron was sent out, upon advice of our sailing in company with Admiral *Balchen* and Lord *Cathcart's* expedition: And thence, from an apprehension of being over-matched, they might not think it advisable to meet with us, till we had parted company, which they might judge would not happen, before our arrival at this Island. These were our speculations at that time; and from hence we had reason to suppose, that we might still fall in with them, in our way to the *Cape de Verd* Islands. We afterwards, in the course of our expedition, were persuaded, that this was the

*Spanish*

*Spanish* squadron commanded by Don *Joseph Pizarro* which was sent out purposely to traverse the views and enterprizes of our squadron, to which, in strength, they were greatly superior. As this *Spanish* armament then was so nearly connected with our expedition, and as the catastrophe it underwent, though not effected by our force, was yet a considerable advantage to this nation, produced in consequence of our equipment, I have, in the following chapter given a summary account of their proceedings, from their first setting out from *Spain* in the year 1740, till the *Asia*, the only ship of the whole squadron which returned to *Europe*, arrived at the *Groyne* in the beginning of the year 1746.

## C H A P. III.

The history of the *Spanish* Squadron commanded by  
Don *Josepb Pizarro*.

THE squadron fitted out by the Court of *Spain*, to attend our motions, and traverse our projects, we supposed to have been the ships seen off *Madera*, as mentioned in the preceding chapter. As this force was sent out particularly against our expedition, I cannot but imagine, that the following history of the casualties it met with, as far as by intercepted letters and other information the same has come to my knowledge, is a very essential part of the present work. For hence it will appear, that we were the occasion, that a considerable part of the naval power of *Spain* was diverted from the prosecution of the ambitious Views of that Court in *Europe*. And whatever men and ships were lost by the enemy in this undertaking, were lost in consequence of the precautions they took to secure themselves against our enterprizes.

This squadron (besides two ships intended for the *West-Indies*, which did not part company till after they had left the *Maderas*) was composed of the following men of war, commanded by Don *Josepb Pizarro* :

The *Asia* of sixty-six guns, and seven hundred men ; this was the Admiral's ship.

The *Guipuscoa* of seventy-four guns, and seven hundred men.

The *Hermiona* of fifty-four guns, and five hundred men.

The *Esperanza* of fifty guns, and four hundred and fifty men.

The *St. Estevan* of forty guns, and three hundred and fifty men.

And a *Patache* of twenty guns.

These ships, over and above their complement of sailors and marines, had on board an old *Spanish* regiment of foot, intended to  
reinforce

reinforce the garrisons on the coast of the *South-Seas*. When this fleet had cruised for some days to the leeward of the *Maderas*, as is mentioned in the preceding chapter, they left that station in the beginning of *November*, and steered for the river of *Plate*, where they arrived the 5th of *January*, O. S. and coming to an anchor in the bay of *Maldonado*, at the mouth of that river, their Admiral *Pizarro* sent immediately to *Buenos Ayres* for a supply of provisions ; for they had departed from *Spain* with only four months provisions on board. While they lay here expecting this supply, they received intelligence, by the Treachery of the *Portuguese* Governor of *St. Catherine's*, of Mr. *Anson's* having arrived at that Island on the 21st of *December* preceding, and of his preparing to put to sea again with the utmost expedition. *Pizarro*, notwithstanding his superior force, had his reasons (and as some say his orders likewise) for avoiding our squadron any where short of the *South-Seas*. He was besides extremely desirous of getting round *Cape Horn* before us, as he imagined that step alone would effectually baffle all our designs ; and therefore, on hearing that we were in his neighbourhood, and that we should soon be ready to proceed for *Cape Horn*, he weighed anchor with the five large ships, (the *Patache* being disabled and condemned, and the men taken out of her) after a stay of seventeen days only, and got under sail without his provisions, which arrived at *Maldonado* within a day or two after his departure. But notwithstanding the precipitation, with which he departed, we put to sea from *St. Catherine's* four days before him, and in some part of our passage to *Cape Horn*, the two squadrons were so near together, that the *Pearl*, one of our ships, being separated from the rest, fell in with the *Spanish* Fleet, and mistaking the *Asia* for the *Centurion*, had got within gun-shot of *Pizarro*, before she discovered her error, and narrowly escaped being taken.

It being the 22d of *January* when the *Spaniards* weighed from *Maldonado*, (as has been already mentioned) they could not expect to get into the latitude of *Cape Horn* before the equinox ; and as they had reason to apprehend very tempestuous weather in doubling  
it

it at that season, and as the *Spanish* sailors, being for the most part accustomed to a fair weather country, might be expected to be very averse to so dangerous and fatiguing a navigation, the better to encourage them, some part of their pay was advanced to them in *European* goods, which they were to be permitted to dispose of in the *South-Seas*, that so the hopes of the great profit, each man was to make on his venture, might animate him in his duty, and render him less disposed to repine at the labour, the hardships and the perils he would in all probability meet with before his arrival on the coast of *Peru*.

*Pizarro* with his squadron having, towards the latter end of *February*, run the length of *Cape Horn*, he then stood to the westward in order to double it; but in the night, of the last day of *February*, O. S. while with this view they were turning to windward, the *Guipuscoa*, the *Hermiona*, and the *Esperanza*, were separated from the Admiral; and, on the 6th of *March* following, the *Guipuscoa* was separated from the other two; and, on the 7th (being the day after we had passed *Streights le Maire*) there came on a most furious storm at N W, which in despite of all their efforts, drove the whole squadron to the eastward, and after several fruitless attempts, obliged them to bear away for the river of *Plate*, where *Pizarro* in the *Asia* arrived about the middle of *May*, and a few days after him the *Esperanza* and the *Estevan*. The *Hermiona* was supposed to founder at sea, for she was never heard of more; and the *Guipuscoa* was run a-shore, and sunk on the coast of *Brazil*. The calamities of all kinds, which this squadron underwent in this unsuccessful navigation, can only be paralleled by what we ourselves experienced in the same climate, when buffeted by the same storms. There was indeed some diversity in our distresses, which rendered it difficult to decide, whose situation was most worthy of commiseration. For to all the misfortunes we had in common with each other, as shattered rigging, leaky ships, and the fatigues and despondency, which necessarily attend these disasters, there was superadded on board our squadron

dron the ravage of a most destructive and incurable disease, and on board the *Spanish* Squadron the devastation of famine.

For this Squadron, either from the hurry of their outset, their presumption of a supply at *Buenos Ayres*, or from other less obvious motives, departed from *Spain*, as has been already observed, with no more than four months provision on board, and even that, as it is said, at short allowance only ; so that, when by the storms they met with off Cape *Horn*, their continuance at sea was prolonged a month or more beyond their expectation, they were reduced to such infinite distress, that rats, when they could be caught, were sold for four dollars a-piece ; and a sailor, who died on board, had his death concealed for some days by his brother, who, during that time, lay in the same hammock with the corpse, only to receive the dead man's allowance of provisions. In this dreadful situation they were alarmed (if their horrors were capable of augmentation) by the discovery of a conspiracy among the marines, on board the *Asia*, the Admiral's ship. This had taken its rise chiefly from the miseries they endured : For though no less was proposed by the conspirators than the massacring the officers and the whole crew, yet their motive for this bloody resolution seemed to be no more than their desire of relieving their hunger, by appropriating the whole ship's provisions to themselves. But their designs were prevented, when just upon the point of execution, by means of one of their confessors, and three of their ringleaders were immediately put to death. However, though the conspiracy was suppressed, their other calamities admitted of no alleviation, but grew each day more and more destructive. So that by the complicated distress of fatigue, sickness, and hunger, the three ships which escaped lost the greatest part of their men : The *Asia*, their Admiral's ship, arrived at *Monte Vedio* in the river of *Plate*, with half her crew only ; the *St. Estevan* had lost in like manner half her hands, when she anchored in the bay of *Barragan* ; the *Esperanza*, a fifty gun ship, was still more unfortunate, for of four hundred and fifty hands which she brought from *Spain*, only fifty-eight remained alive, and the whole regiment of foot perished  
except



except sixty men. But to give the reader a more distinct and particular idea of what they underwent upon this occasion, I shall lay before him a short account of the fate of the *Guipuscoa*, extracted from a letter written by Don *Joséph Mendinuetta* her Captain, to a person of distinction at *Lima* ; a copy of which fell into our hands afterwards in the *South-Seas*.

He mentions, that he separated from the *Hermiona* and the *Esperanza* in a fog, on the 6th of *March*, being then, as I suppose, to the S. E. of *Staten-Land*, and plying to the westward ; that in the night after, it blew a furious storm at N. W, which, at half an hour after ten, split his main-sail, and obliged him to bear away with his foresail ; that the ship went ten knots an hour with a prodigious sea, and often ran her gangway under water ; that he likewise sprung his main-mast ; and the ship made so much water, that with four pumps and bailing he could not free her. That on the 19th it was calm, but the sea continued so high, that the ship in rolling opened all her upper works and seams, and started the butt ends of her planking, and the greatest part of her top timbers, the bolts being drawn by the violence of her roll : That in this condition, with other additional disasters to the hull and rigging, they continued beating to the westward till the 12th : That they were then in sixty degrees of south latitude, in great want of provisions, numbers every day perishing by the fatigue of pumping, and those who survived, being quite dispirited by labour, hunger, and the severity of the weather, they having two spans of snow upon the decks : That then finding the wind fixed in the western quarter, and blowing strong, and consequently their passage to the westward impossible, they resolved to bear away for the river of *Plate* : That on the 22d, they were obliged to throw overboard all the upper-deck guns, and an anchor, and to take six turns of the cable round the ship to prevent her opening : That on the 4th of *April*, it being calm, but a very high sea, the ship rolled so much, that the main-mast came by the board, and in a few hours after she lost, in like manner, her fore-mast and her mizen-mast ; and that, to accumu-  
late

late their misfortunes, they were soon obliged to cut away their bowsprit, to diminish, if possible, the leakage at her head : That by this time he had lost two hundred and fifty men by hunger and fatigue ; for those who were capable of working at the pumps, (at which every Officer without exception took his turn) were allowed only an ounce and half of biscuit *per diem* ; and those who were so sick or weak, that they could not assist in this necessary labour, had no more than an ounce of wheat ; so that it was common for the men to fall down dead at the pumps : That, including the Officers, they could only muster from eighty to a hundred persons capable of duty : That the South-West winds blew so fresh, after they had lost their masts, that they could not immediately set up jury masts, but were obliged to drive like a wreck, between the latitudes of 32 and 38, till the 24th of *April*, when they made the coast of *Brazil* at *Rio de Patas*, ten leagues to the southward of the Island of *St. Catherine's* ; that here they came to an anchor, and that the Captain was very desirous of proceeding to *St. Catherine's* if possible, in order to save the hull of the ship, and the guns and stores on board her ; but the crew instantly left off pumping, and being enraged at the hardships they had suffered, and the numbers they had lost, (there being at that time no less than thirty dead bodies lying on the deck) they all with one voice cried out ON SHORE, ON SHORE, and obliged the Captain to run the ship in directly for the land, where, the 5th day after, she sunk with her stores, and all her furniture on board her, but the remainder of the crew, whom hunger and fatigue had spared, to the number of four hundred, got safe on shore.

From this account of the adventures and catastrophe of the *Guipuscoa*, we may form some conjecture of the manner in which the *Hermiona* was lost, and of the distresses endured by the three remaining ships of the squadron, which got into the river of *Plate*. These last being in great want of masts, yards, rigging, and all kind of naval stores, and having no supply at *Buenos Ayres*, nor in any of their neighbouring settlements, *Pizarro* dispatched an advice-boat with

a letter of credit to *Rio Janeiro*, to purchase what was wanting from the *Portuguese*. He at the same time, sent an express across the continent to *St. Jago in Chili*, to be thence forwarded to the Viceroy of *Peru*, informing him of the disasters that had befallen his Squadron, and desiring a remittance of 200,000 dollars from the royal chests at *Lima*, to enable him to victual and refit his remaining ships, that he might be again in a condition to attempt the passage to the *South-Seas*, as soon as the season of the year should be more favourable. It is mentioned by the *Spaniards* as a most extraordinary circumstance, that the *Indian* charged with this express (though it was then the depth of winter, when the *Cordilleras* are esteemed impassable on account of the snow) was only thirteen days in his journey from *Buenos Ayres* to *St. Jago in Chili*; though these places are distant three hundred *Spanish* leagues, near forty of which are amongst the snows and precipices of the *Cordilleras*.

The return to this dispatch of *Pizarro's* from the Viceroy of *Peru* was no ways favourable; instead of 200,000 dollars, the sum demanded, the Viceroy remitted him only 100,000, telling him, that it was with great difficulty he was able to procure him even that: Though the inhabitants at *Lima*, who considered the presence of *Pizarro* as absolutely necessary to their security, were much discontented at this procedure, and did not fail to assert, that it was not the want of money, but the interested views of some of the Viceroy's confidants, that prevented *Pizarro* from having the whole sum he had asked for.

The advice-boat sent to *Rio Janeiro* also executed her commission but imperfectly; for though she brought back a considerable quantity of pitch, tar and cordage, yet she could not procure either masts or yards: And as an additional misfortune, *Pizarro* was disappointed of some masts, he expected from *Paraguay*; for a carpenter whom he entrusted with a large sum of money, and had sent there to cut masts, instead of prosecuting the business he was employed in, had married in the country, and refused to return. However, by removing the masts of the *Esperanza* into the *Asia*,  
and

and making use of what spare masts and yards they had on board, they made a shift to refit the *Asia* and the *St. Estevan*. And in the *October* following, *Pizarro* was preparing to put to sea with these two ships, in order to attempt the passage round *Cape Horn* a second time; but the *St. Estevan*, in coming down the river *Plate*, ran on a shoal, and beat off her rudder, on which, and other damages she received, she was condemned and broke up, and *Pizarro* in the *Asia* proceeded to sea without her. Having now the summer before him, and the winds favourable, no doubt was made of his having a fortunate and speedy passage; but being off *Cape Horn*, and going right before the wind in very moderate weather, though in a swelling sea, by some misconduct of the officer of the watch the ship rolled away her masts, and was a second time obliged to put back to the river *Plate* in great distress.

The *Asia* having considerably suffered in this second unfortunate expedition, the *Esperanza*, which had been left behind at *Monte Vedio*, was ordered to be refitted, the command of her being given to *Mindinuetta*, who was Captain of the *Guipuscoa*, when she was lost. He, in the *November* of the succeeding year, that is, in *November* 1742, sailed from the river of *Plate* for the *South-Seas*, and arrived safe on the coast of *Cbili*; where his *Commodore Pizarro* passing over land from *Buenos Ayres* met him. There were great animosities and contests between these two Gentlemen at their meeting, occasioned principally by the claim of *Pizarro* to command the *Esperanza*, which *Mindinuetta* had brought round: For *Mindinuetta* refused to deliver her up to him; insisting, that as he came into the *South-Seas* alone, and under no superior, it was not now in the power of *Pizarro* to resume that authority, which he had once parted with. However, the President of *Cbili* interposing, and declaring for *Pizarro*, *Mindinuetta*, after a long and obstinate struggle, was obliged to submit.

But *Pizarro* had not yet compleated the series of his adventures; for when he and *Mindinuetta* came back by land from *Cbili* to *Buenos Ayres*, in the year 1745, they found at *Monte Vedio* the

*Asia*, which near three years before they had left there. This ship they resolved, if possible, to carry to *Europe*, and with this view they refitted her in the best manner they could : But their great difficulty was to procure a sufficient number of hands to navigate her, for all the remaining sailors of the Squadron to be met with in the neighbourhood of *Buenos Ayres*, did not amount to a hundred men. They endeavoured to supply this defect by pressing many of the inhabitants of *Buenos Ayres*, and putting on board besides all the *English* prisoners then in their custody, together with a number of *Portuguese* smugglers, which they had taken at different times, and some of the *Indians* of the country. Among these last there was a Chief and ten of his followers, which had been surprized by a party of *Spanish* soldiers about three months before. The name of this Chief was *Orellana*, he belonged to a very powerful Tribe, which had committed great ravages in the neighbourhood of *Buenos Ayres*. With this motley crew (all of them, except the *European Spaniards*, extremely averse to the voyage) *Pizarro* set sail from *Monte Vedio* in the river of *Plate*, about the beginning of *November 1745*, and the native *Spaniards* being no strangers to the dissatisfaction of their forced men, treated both those, the *English* prisoners and the *Indians*, with great insolence and barbarity ; but more particularly the *Indians*, for it was common for the meanest officers in the ship to beat them cruelly on the slightest pretences, and oftentimes only to exert their superiority. *Orellana* and his followers, though in appearance sufficiently patient and submissive, meditated a severe revenge for all these inhumanities. As he conversed very well in *Spanish*, (these *Indians* having in time of peace a great intercourse with *Buenos Ayres*) he affected to talk with such of the *English* as understood that language, and seemed very desirous of being informed, how many *Englishmen* there were on board, and which they were. As he knew that the *English* were as much enemies to the *Spaniards* as himself, he had doubtless an intention of disclosing his purposes to them, and making them partners in the scheme he had projected for revenging his wrongs, and recovering his liberty ; but  
 having

having founded them at a distance, and not finding them so precipitate and vindictive as he expected, he proceeded no further with them, but resolved to trust alone to the resolution of his ten faithful followers. These, it should seem, readily engaged to observe his directions, and to execute whatever commands he gave them ; and having agreed on the measures necessary to be taken, they first furnished themselves with *Dutch* knives sharp at the point, which being the common knives used in the ship, they found no difficulty in procuring : Besides this, they employed their leisure in secretly cutting out thongs from raw hides, of which there were great numbers on board, and in fixing to each end of these thongs the double-headed shot of the small quarter-deck guns ; this, when swung round their heads, according to the practice of their country, was a most mischievous weapon, in the use of which the *Indians* about *Buenos Ayres* are trained from their infancy, and consequently are extremely expert. These particulars being in good forwardness, the execution of their scheme was perhaps precipitated by a particular outrage committed on *Orellana* himself. For one of the Officers, who was a very brutal fellow, ordered *Orellana* aloft, which being what he was incapable of performing, the officer, under pretence of his disobedience, beat him with such violence, that he left him bleeding on the deck, and stupified for some time with his bruises and wounds. This usage undoubtedly heightened his thirst for revenge, and made him eager and impatient, till the means of executing it were in his power ; so that within a day or two after this incident, he and his followers opened their desperate resolves in the ensuing manner.

It was about nine in the evening, when many of the principal Officers were on the quarter-deck, indulging in the freshness of the night air ; the waste of the ship was filled with live cattle, and the fore-castle was manned with its customary watch. *Orellana* and his companions, under cover of the night, having prepared their weapons, and thrown off their trouzers and the more cumbrous part of their dress, came all together on the quarter-deck, and drew towards the

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the door of the great cabin. The Boatswain immediately reprimanded them, and ordered them to be gone. On this *Orellana* spoke to his followers in his native language, when four of them drew off, two towards each gangway, and the Chief and the six remaining *Indians* seemed to be slowly quitting the quarter-deck. When the detached *Indians* had taken possession of the gangway, *Orellana* placed his hands hollow to his mouth, and bellowed out the war-cry used by those savages, which is said to be the harshest and most terrifying sound known in nature. This hideous yell was the signal for beginning the massacre : For on this they all drew their knives, and brandished their prepared double-headed shot, and the six with their Chief, which remained on the quarter-deck, immediately fell on the *Spaniards*, who were intermingled with them, and laid near forty of them at their feet, of which above twenty were killed on the spot, and the rest disabled. Many of the Officers, in the beginning of the tumult, pushed into the great cabin, where they put out the lights, and barricaded the door : Whilst of the others, who had avoided the first fury of the *Indians*, some endeavoured to escape along the gangways into the fore-castle, where the *Indians*, placed on purpose, stabbed the greatest part of them as they attempted to pass by, or forced them off the gangways into the waste : Some threw themselves voluntarily over the barricades into the waste, and thought themselves fortunate to lie concealed amongst the cattle : But the greatest part escaped up the main shrouds, and sheltered themselves either in the tops or rigging. And though the *Indians* attacked only the quarter-deck, yet the watch in the fore-castle finding their communication cut off, and being terrified by the wounds of the few, who not being killed on the spot, had strength sufficient to force their passage, and not knowing either who their enemies were, or what were their numbers, they likewise gave all over for lost, and in great confusion ran up into the rigging of the fore-mast and bowsprit.

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Thus these eleven *Indians*, with a resolution perhaps without example, possessed themselves almost in an instant of the quarter-deck of a ship mounting sixty-six guns, and mann'd with near five hundred hands, and continued in peaceable possession of this post a considerable time. For the officers in the great cabin, (amongst whom were *Pizarro* and *Mindinuetta*) the crew between decks, and those who had escaped into the tops and rigging, were only anxious for their own safety, and were for a long time incapable of forming any project for suppressing the insurrection, and recovering the possession of the ship. It is true, the yells of the *Indians*, the groans of the wounded, and the confused clamours of the crew, all heightened by the obscurity of the night, had at first greatly magnified their danger, and had filled them with the imaginary terrors, which darkness, disorder, and an ignorance of the real strength of an enemy never fail to produce. For as the *Spaniards* were sensible of the disaffection of their prest hands, and were also conscious of their barbarity to their prisoners, they imagined, the conspiracy was general, and considered their own destruction as infallible; so that, it is said, some of them had once taken the resolution of leaping into the sea, but were prevented by their companions.

However, when the *Indians* had entirely cleared the quarter-deck, the tumult in a great measure subsided; for those who had escaped, were kept silent by their fears, and the *Indians* were incapable of pursuing them to renew the disorder. *Orellana*, when he saw himself master of the quarter-deck, broke open the arm-chest, which, on a slight suspicion of mutiny, had been ordered there a few days before, as to a place of the greatest security. Here he took it for granted, he should find cutlasses sufficient for himself and his companions, in the use of which weapon they were all extremely skilful, and with these, it was imagined, they proposed to have forced the great cabin: But on opening the chest, there appeared nothing but fire-arms, which to them were of no use. There were indeed cutlasses in the chest, but they were hid by the fire-arms being laid over them. This was a sensible disappointment to them,



them, and by this time *Pizarro* and his companions in the great cabin were capable of conversing aloud, through the cabin windows and port-holes, with those in the gun-room and between decks, and from hence they learnt, that the *English* (whom they principally suspected) were all safe below, and had not intermeddled in this mutiny; and by other particulars they at last discovered, that none were concerned in it but *Orellana* and his people. On this *Pizarro* and the Officers resolved to attack them on the quarter-deck, before any of the discontented on board should so far recover their first surprize, as to reflect on the facility and certainty of seizing the ship by a junction with the *Indians* in the present emergency. With this view *Pizarro* got together what arms were in the cabin, and distributed them to those who were with him: But there were no other fire-arms to be met with but pistols, and for these they had neither powder nor ball. However, having now settled a correspondence with the gun-room, they lowered down a bucket out of the cabin-window, into which the gunner, out of one of the gun-room ports, put a quantity of pistol cartridges. When they had thus procured ammunition, and had loaded their pistols, they set the cabin-door partly open, and fired several shot amongst the *Indians* on the quarter-deck, tho' at first without effect: But at last *Mindinuetta*, whom we have often mentioned, had the good fortune to shoot *Orellana* dead on the spot; on which his faithful companions abandoning all thoughts of farther resistance, instantly leaped into the sea, where they every man perished. Thus was this insurrection quelled, and the possession of the quarter-deck regained, after it had been full two hours in the power of this great and daring Chief, and his gallant unhappy countrymen.

*Pizarro* having escaped this imminent peril steered for *Europe*, and arrived safe on the coast of *Gallicia* in the beginning of the year 1746, after having been absent between four and five years, and having, by his attendance on our expedition, diminished the naval power of *Spain* by above three thousand hands, (the flower of their sailors) and by four considerable ships of war and a Patache. For

we

we have seen, that the *Hermiona* foundered at sea; the *Guipuscoa* was stranded, and sunk on the coast of *Brazil*; the *St. Estevan* was condemned and broke up in the river of *Plate*; and the *Esperanza* being left in the *South-Seas*, is doubtless by this time incapable of returning to *Spain*. So that the *Asia* only, with less than one hundred hands, may be regarded as all the remains of that squadron, with which *Pizarro* first put to sea. And whoever considers the very large proportion, which this squadron bore to the whole navy of *Spain*, will, I believe, confess, that had our undertaking been attended with no other advantages than that of ruining so great a part of the sea-force of so dangerous an enemy, this alone would be a sufficient equivalent for our equipment, and an incontestable proof of the service, which the Nation has thence received. Having thus concluded this summary of *Pizarro's* adventures, I shall now return again to the narration of our own transactions.

## C H A P. IV.

From *Madera* to *St. Catherine's*.

I HAVE already mentioned, that on the 3d of *November* we weighed from *Madera*, after orders had been given to the Captains to rendezvous at *St. Jago*, one of the *Cape de Verd* Islands, in case the Squadron was separated. But the next day, when we were got to sea, the Commodore considering that the season was far advanced, and that touching at *St. Jago* would create a new delay, he for this reason thought proper to alter his rendezvous, and to appoint the Island of *St. Catherine's*, on the coast of *Brazil*, to be the first place to which the ships of the Squadron were to repair in case of separation.

In our passage to the Island of *St. Catherine's*, we found the direction of the trade-winds to differ considerably from what we had reason to expect, both from the general histories given of these winds, and the experience of former navigators. For the learned *Dr. Halley*, in his account of the trade-winds, which take place in the *Ethiopic* and *Atlantic* Ocean, tells us, that from the latitude of  $28^{\circ}$  N, to the latitude of  $10^{\circ}$  N, there is generally a fresh gale of N. E. wind, which towards the *African* side rarely comes to the eastward of E. N. E, or passes to the northward of N. N. E: But on the *American* side, the wind is somewhat more easily, though most commonly even there it is a point or two to the northward of the East: That from  $10^{\circ}$  N. to  $4^{\circ}$  N, the calms and tornadoes take place; and from  $4^{\circ}$  N. to  $30^{\circ}$  S, the winds are generally and perpetually between the South and the East. This account we expected to have verified by our own experience; but we found considerable variations from it, both in respect to the steadiness of the winds, and the quarter from whence they blew. For though we met with a N. E. wind about the latitude of  $28^{\circ}$  N, yet from the  
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latitude of  $25^{\circ}$  to the latitude of  $18^{\circ}$  N, the wind was never once to the northward of the East, but on the contrary, almost constantly to the southward of it. However, from thence to the latitude of  $6^{\circ} : 20' N$ , we had it usually to the northward of the East, though not entirely, it having for a short time changed to E. S. E. From hence, to about  $4^{\circ} 46' N$ , the weather was very unsettled; sometimes the wind was N. E. then changed to S. E., and sometimes we had a dead calm, attended with small rain and lightning. After this, the wind continued almost invariably between the S. and E, to the latitude of  $7^{\circ} : 30' S$ ; and then again as invariably between the N. and E, to the latitude of  $15^{\circ} : 30' S$ ; then E. and S. E, to  $21^{\circ} : 37' S$ . But after this, even to the latitude of  $27^{\circ} : 44' S$ , the wind was never once between the S. and the E, though we had it at all times in all the other quarters of the compass. But this last circumstance may be in some measure accounted for, from our approach to the main continent of the *Brazils*. I mention not these particulars with a view of cavilling at the received accounts of these trade-winds, which I doubt not are in general sufficiently accurate; but I thought it a matter worthy of public notice, that such deviations from the established rules do sometimes take place. Besides this observation may not only be of service to Navigators, by putting them on their guard against these hitherto unexpected irregularities, but is a circumstance necessary to be attended to in the solution of that great question about the causes of trade-winds and monsoons, a question, which, in my opinion, has not been hitherto discussed with that clearness and accuracy, which its importance (whether it be considered as a naval or philosophical inquiry) seems to demand.

On the 16th of *November*, one of our Victuallers made a signal to speak with the Commodore, and we shortened sail for her to come up with us. The Master came on board, and acquainted Mr. *Anson*, that he had complied with the terms of his charter-party, and desired to be unloaded and dismissed. Mr. *Anson*, on consulting the Captains of the Squadron, found all the ships had still such quantities of provision between their decks, and were withal so deep,

that they could not without great difficulty take in their several proportions of brandy from the *Industry Pink*, one of the Victuallers only : Consequently he was obliged to continue the other of them, the *Anna Pink*, in the service of attending the squadron. This being resolved on, the Commodore the next day made a signal for the ships to bring too, and to take on board their shares of the brandy from the *Industry Pink* ; and in this the long boats of the squadron were employed the three following days, that is, till the 19th in the evening, when the *Pink* being unloaded, she parted company with us, being bound for *Barbadoes*, there to take in a freight for *England*. Most of the Officers of the squadron took the opportunity of writing to their friends at home by this ship ; but she was afterwards, as I have been since informed, unhappily taken by the *Spaniards*.

On the 20th of *November*, the Captains of the squadron represented to the Commodore, that their ships companies were very sickly, and that it was their own opinion as well as their surgeons, that it would tend to the preservation of the men to let in more air between decks ; but that their ships were so deep, they could not possibly open their lower ports. On this representation, the Commodore ordered six air scuttles to be cut in each ship, in such places where they would least weaken it.

And on this occasion I cannot but observe, how much it is the duty of all those, who either by office or authority, have any influence in the direction of our naval affairs, to attend to this important article, the preservation of the lives and health of our seamen. If it could be supposed, that the motives of humanity were insufficient for this purpose, yet policy, and a regard to the success of our arms, and the interest and honour of each particular Commander, should naturally lead us to a careful and impartial examination of every probable method proposed for maintaining a ship's crew in health and vigour. But hath this been always done ? Have the late invented plain and obvious methods of keeping our ships sweet and clean, by a constant supply of fresh air, been considered with that candour and temper, which the great benefits promised hereby

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ought naturally to have inspired? On the contrary, have not these salutary schemes been often treated with neglect and contempt? And have not some of those who have been entrusted with experimenting their effects, been guilty of the most indefensible partiality, in the accounts they have given of these trials? Indeed, it must be confessed, that many distinguished persons, both in the direction and command of our fleets, have exerted themselves on these occasions with a judicious and dispassionate examination, becoming the interesting nature of the inquiry; but the wonder is, that any could be found irrational enough to act a contrary part, in despite of the strongest dictates of prudence and humanity. I must however own, that I do not believe this conduct to have arisen from motives so savage, as the first reflection thereon does naturally suggest: But I rather impute it to an obstinate, and in some degree, superstitious attachment to such practices as have been long established, and to a settled contempt and hatred of all kinds of innovations, especially such as are projected by landmen and persons residing on shore. But let us return from this, I hope not, impertinent digression.

We crossed the equinoctial with a fine fresh gale at S. E, on *Friday* the 28th of *November*, at four in the morning, being then in the longitude of  $27^{\circ} : 59'$  W. from *London*. And on the 2d of *December*, in the morning, we saw a sail in the N. W. quarter, and made the *Gloucester's* and *Tryal's* signals to chase; and half an hour after, we let out our reefs and chased with the squadron; and about noon a signal was made for the *Wager* to take our remaining Victualler, the *Anna Pink*, in tow. But at seven in the evening, finding we did not near the chace, and that the *Wager* was very far a-stern, we shortened sail, and made a signal for the cruizers to join the squadron. The next day but one we again discovered a sail, which, on a nearer approach, we judged to be the same vessel. We chased her the whole day, and though we rather gained upon her, yet night came on before we could overtake her, which obliged us to give over the chace, to collect our scattered squadron. We were  
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much chagrined at the escape of this vessel, as we then apprehended her to be an advice-boat sent from *Old Spain* to *Buenos Ayres*, with notice of our expedition. But we have since learnt, that we were deceived in this conjecture, and that it was our *East-India* Company's Packet bound to *St. Helena*.

On the 10th of *December*, being, by our accounts, in the latitude of  $20^{\circ}$  S, and  $36^{\circ} : 30'$  longitude West from *London*, the *Tryal* fired a gun to denote soundings. We immediately sounded, and found sixty fathom water, the bottom coarse ground with broken shells. The *Tryal* being a-head of us, had at one time thirty-seven fathom, which afterwards increased to 90 : And then she found no bottom, which happened to us too at our second trial, though we sounded with a hundred and fifty fathom of line. This is the shoal which is laid down in most charts by the name of the *Abrollos* ; and it appeared we were upon the very edge of it ; perhaps farther in, it may be extremely dangerous. We were then, by our different accounts, from ninety to sixty leagues East of the coast of *Brazil*. The next day but one we spoke with a *Portuguese* Brigantine from *Rio Janeiro*, bound to *Bahia del todos Santos*, who informed us, that we were thirty four leagues from Cape *St. Thomas*, and forty leagues from Cape *Frio*, which last bore from us W. S. W. By our accounts we were near eighty leagues from Cape *Frio* ; and though, on the information of this Brigantine, we altered our course, and stood more to the southward, yet by our coming in with the land afterwards, we were fully convinced that our reckoning was much correcter than our *Portuguese* intelligence. We found a considerable current setting to the southward, after we had passed the latitude of  $16^{\circ}$  S. And the same took place all along the coast of *Brazil*, and even to the southward of the river of *Plata*, it amounting sometimes to thirty miles in twenty-four hours, and once to above forty miles.

If this current is occasioned (as it is most probable) by the running off of the water, accumulated on the coast of *Brazil* by the constant sweeping of the eastern trade-wind over the *Ethiopic* Ocean,

Ocean, then it is most natural to suppose, that its general course is determined by the bearings of the adjacent shore. Perhaps too, in almost every other instance of currents, the same may hold true, as I believe no examples occur of considerable currents being observed at any great distance from land. If this then could be laid down for a general principle, it would be always easy to correct the reckoning by the observed latitude. But it were much to be wished, for the general interests of navigation, that the actual settings of the different currents which are known to take place in various parts of the world, were examined more frequently and accurately than hitherto appears to have been done.

We now began to grow impatient for a sight of land, both for the recovery of our sick, and for the refreshment and security of those who as yet continued healthy. When we departed from *St. Helens*, we were in so good a condition, that we lost but two men on board the *Centurion*, in our long passage to *Madera*. But in this present run between *Madera* and *St. Catherine's*, we were remarkably sickly, so that many died, and great numbers were confined to their hammocks, both in our own ship, and in the rest of the squadron, and several of these past all hopes of recovery. The disorders they in general laboured under were such as are common to the hot climates, and what most ships bound to the southward experience in a greater or less degree. These are those kind of fevers, which they usually call *Calentures*: A disease, which was not only terrible in its first instance, but even the remains of it often proved fatal to those who considered themselves as recovered from it. For it always left them in a very weak and helpless condition, and usually afflicted either with fluxes or tenesmus's. By our continuance at sea all these complaints were every day increasing, so that it was with great joy we discovered the coast of *Brazil* on the 18th of *December*, at seven in the morning.

The coast of *Brazil* appeared high and mountainous land, extending from the W. to W. S. W, and when we first saw it, it was



about seventeen leagues distant. At noon we perceived a low double land, bearing W. S. W. about ten leagues distant, which we took to be the Island of *St. Catherine's*. That afternoon and the next morning, the wind being N. N. W, we gained very little to windward, and were apprehensive of being driven to the leeward of the Island; but a little before noon, the next day, the wind came about to the southward, and enabled us to steer in between the North point of *St. Catherine's*, and the neighbouring Island of *Alvoreda*. As we stood in for the land, we had regular soundings gradually decreasing, from thirty-six to twelve fathom, all muddy ground. In this last depth of water we let go our anchor at five o'clock in the evening of the 18th, the North West point of the Island of *St. Catherine's* bearing S. S. W, distant three miles; and the Island *Alvoreda* N. N. E, distant two leagues. Here we found the tide to set S. S. E. and N. N. W, at the rate of two knots, the tide of flood coming from the southward. We could from our ships observe two fortifications at a considerable distance within us, which seemed designed to prevent the passage of an enemy between the Island of *St. Catherine's* and the main. And we could soon perceive that our squadron had alarmed the coast, for we saw the two forts hoist their colours, and fire several guns, which we supposed were signals for assembling the inhabitants. To prevent any confusion, the Commodore immediately sent a boat with an officer on shore, to compliment the Governor, and to desire a Pilot to carry us into the road. The Governor returned a very civil answer, and ordered us a Pilot. On the morning of the 20th we weighed and stood in, and towards noon the Pilot came on board us, who, the same afternoon, brought us to an anchor in five fathom and an half, in a large commodious bay on the continent side, called by the *French*, *Bon Port*. In standing from our last anchorage to this place, we every where found an oozy bottom, with a depth of water first regularly decreasing to five fathom, and then increasing to seven, after which we had six and five fathom alternately. The next morning

ing we weighed again with the Squadron, in order to run above the two fortifications we have mentioned, which are called the castles of *Santa Cruz*, and *St. Juan*. Our soundings now between the Island and the Main, were four, five and six fathom, with muddy ground. As we passed by the castle of *Santa Cruz* we saluted it with eleven guns, and were answered by an equal number; and at one in the afternoon, the Squadron came to an anchor in five fathom and a half, the Governor's Island bearing N. N. W, *St. Juan's* Castle N. E.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E, and the Island of *St. Antonio* South. In this position we moored at the Island of *St. Catherine's* on *Sunday* the 21<sup>st</sup> of *December*, the whole Squadron being, as I have already mentioned, sickly, and in great want of refreshments: Both which inconveniences we hoped to have soon removed at this settlement, celebrated by former Navigators for its healthiness, and the plenty of its provisions, and for the freedom, indulgence, and friendly assistance there given to the ships of all *European* Nations, in amity with the Crown of *Portugal*.

## C H A P. V.

Proceedings at St. *Catherine's*, and a description of the place, with a short account of *Brazil*.

OUR first care, after having moored our ships, was to get our sick men on shore, preparatory to which, each ship was ordered by the Commadore to erect two tents : One of them for the reception of the diseased, and the other for the accommodation of the surgeon and his assistants. We sent about eighty sick from the *Centurion*, and the other ships, I believe, sent nearly as many, in proportion to the number of their hands. As soon as we had performed this necessary duty, we scraped our decks, and gave our ship a thorough cleansing ; then smoked it between decks, and after all washed every part well with vinegar. These operations were extremely necessary for correcting the noisome stench on board, and destroying the vermin ; for from the number of our men, and the heat of the climate, both these nuisances had increased upon us to a very loathsome degree, and besides being most intolerably offensive, they were doubtless in some sort productive of the sickness we had laboured under for a considerable time, before our arrival at this Island.

Our next employment was wooding and watering our squadron, caulking our ships sides and decks, overhaling our rigging, and securing our masts against the tempestuous weather we were, in all probability, to meet with in our passage round Cape *Horn*, in so advanced and inconvenient a season. But before I engage in the particulars of these transactions, it will not be improper to give some account of the present state of this Island of St. *Catherine's*, and of the neighbouring country ; both as the circumstances of this place are now greatly changed from what they were in the time of former writers, and as these changes laid us under many more difficulties





and perplexities than we had reason to expect, or than other *British* ships, hereafter bound to the *South-Seas*, may perhaps think it prudent to struggle with.

This Island is esteemed by the natives to be no where above two leagues in breadth, though about nine in length; it lies in  $49^{\circ} : 45'$  of West longitude from *London*, and extends from the South latitude of  $27^{\circ} 35'$  to that of  $28^{\circ}$ . Although it be of a considerable height, yet it is scarce discernible at the distance of ten leagues, being then obscured under the continent of *Brazil*, whose mountains are exceeding high; but on a nearer approach it is easy to be distinguished, and may be readily known by a number of small Islands lying at each end, and scattered along the East side of it. In the annexed plate there is exhibited a very exact view of the N. E. end of the Island, where (*a*) is its N. E. point, as it appears when it bears N. W. And (*b*) is the small Island of *Alvaredo*, bearing N. N. W, at the distance of 7 leagues. The best entrance to the harbour is between the point (*a*) and the Island of *Alvaredo*, where ships may pass under the guidance of their lead, without the least apprehensions of danger. The view of this North entrance of the harbour is represented in the second plate, where (*a*) is the N. W. end of *St. Catherine's* Island, (*b*) *Parrot* Island, (*c*) a battery on *St. Catherine's*, and (*d*) a battery on a small Island near the continent. *Frezier* has given a draught of this Island of *St. Catherine's*, and of the neighbouring coast, and the minuter Isles adjacent; but he has by mistake called the Island of *Alvaredo* the *Isle de Gal*, whereas the true *Isle de Gal* lies seven or eight miles to the North-westward of it, and is much smaller. He has also called an Island, to the southward of *St. Catherine's*, *Alvaredo*, and has omitted the Island *Masapura*; in other respects his plan is sufficiently exact.

The North entrance of the harbour is in breadth about five miles, and the distance from thence to the Island of *St. Antonio* is eight miles, and the course from the entrance to *St. Antonio* is S. S. W.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W. About the middle of the Island the harbour is contracted by two points of land to a narrow channel, no more than a quarter of a

mile broad ; and to defend this passage, a battery was erecting on the point of land on the Island side. But this seems to be a very useless work, as the channel has no more than two fathom water, and consequently is navigable only for barks and boats, and therefore seems to be a passage that an enemy could have no inducement to attempt, especially as the common passage at the North end of the Island is so broad and safe, that no squadron can be prevented from coming in by any of their fortifications, when the sea-breeze is made. However, the Brigadier Don *Jose Sylva de Paz*, the Governor of this settlement, is esteemed an expert Engineer, and he doubtless understands one branch of his business very well, which is the advantages which new works bring to those who are entrusted with the care of erecting them : For besides the battery mentioned above, there are three other forts carrying on for the defence of the harbour, none of which are yet completed. The first of these, called *St. Juan*, is built on a point of *St. Catherine's* near *Parrot Island* ; the second, in form of a half moon, is on the Island of *St. Antonio* ; and the third, which seems to be the chief, and has some appearance of a regular fortification, is on an Island near the continent, where the Governor resides.

The soil of the Island is truly luxuriant, producing fruits of many kinds spontaneously ; and the ground is covered over with one continued forest of trees of a perpetual verdure, which from the exuberance of the soil, are so entangled with briars, thorns, and underwood, as to form a thicket absolutely impenetrable, except by some narrow pathways which the inhabitants have made for their own convenience. These, with a few spots cleared for plantations along the shore facing the continent, are the only uncovered parts of the Island. The woods are extremely fragrant, from the many aromack trees and shrubs with which they abound ; and the fruits and vegetables of all climates thrive here, almost without culture, and are to be procured in great plenty ; so that here is no want of pine-apples, peaches, grapes, oranges, lemons, citrons, melons, apricots, nor plantains. There are besides great abundance of two  
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other productions of no small consideration for a sea-store, I mean onions and potatoes. The flesh provisions are however much inferior to the vegetables : There are indeed small wild cattle to be purchased, somewhat like buffaloes, but these are very indifferent food, their flesh being of a loose contexture, and generally of a disagreeable flavour, which is probably owing to the wild calabash on which they feed. There are likewise great plenty of pheasants, but they are not to be compared in taste to those we have in *England*. The other provisions of the place are monkeys, parrots, and above all fish of various sorts, these abound in the harbour, are exceeding good, and are easily caught, for there are a great number of small sandy bays very convenient for haling the *Seyne*.

The water both on the Island and the opposite continent is excellent, and preserves at sea as well as that of the *Thames*. For after it has been in the cask a day or two it begins to purge itself, and stinks most intolerably, and is soon covered over with a green scum : But this in a few days subsides to the bottom, and leaves the water as clear as chrystal, and perfectly sweet. The *French* (who, during their *South-Sea* trade in *Queen Anne's* reign first brought this place into repute) usually wooded and watered in *Bon Port*, on the continent side, where they anchored with great safety in six fathom water ; and this is doubtless the most commodious road for such ships as intend to make only a short stay. But we watered on the *St. Catherine's* side, at a plantation opposite to the Island of *St. Antonio*.

These are the advantages of this Island of *St. Catherine's* ; but there are many inconveniencies attending it, partly from its climate but more from its new regulations, and the late form of government established there. With regard to the climate, it must be remembered, that the woods and hills which surround the harbour, prevent a free circulation of the air. And the vigorous vegetation which constantly takes place there, furnishes such a prodigious quantity of vapour, that all the night and a great part of the morning a thick fog covers the whole country, and continues till either the



sun gathers strength to dissipate it, or it is dispersed by a brisk sea-breeze. This renders the place close and humid, and probably occasioned the many fevers and fluxes we were there afflicted with. To these exceptions I must not omit to add, that all the day we were pestered with great numbers of muscatos, which are not much unlike the gnats in *England*, but more venomous in their stings. And at sun-set, when the muscatos retired, they were succeeded by an infinity of sand-flies, which though scarce discernible to the naked eye, make a mighty buzzing, and wherever they bite raise a small bump in the flesh, which is soon attended with a painful itching, like that arising from the bite of an *English* harvest bug. But as the only light in which this place deserves our consideration, is its favourable situation for supplying and refreshing our cruizers intended for the *South-Seas*: In this view its greatest inconveniencies remain still to be related; and to do this more distinctly, it will not be amiss to consider the changes which it has lately undergone, both in its inhabitants, its police, and its governor.

In the time of *Frezier* and *Shelvocke*, this place served only as a retreat to vagabonds and outlaws, who fled thither from all parts of *Brazil*. They did indeed acknowledge a subjection to the Crown of *Portugal*, and had a person among them whom they called their Captain, who was considered in some sort as their Governor. But both their allegiance to their King, and their obedience to their Captain, seemed to be little more than verbal. For as they had plenty of provisions but no money, they were in a condition to support themselves without the assistance of any neighbouring settlements, and had not amongst them the means of tempting any adjacent Governor to busy his authority about them. In this situation they were extremely hospitable and friendly to such foreign ships as came amongst them. For these ships wanting only provisions, of which the natives had great store; and the natives wanting clothes, (for they often despised money, and refused to take it)

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which the ships furnished them with in exchange for their provisions, both sides found their account in this traffic; and their Captain or Governor had neither power nor interest to restrain it or to tax it. But of late (for reasons which shall be hereafter mentioned) these honest vagabonds have been obliged to receive amongst them a new colony, and to submit to new laws and new forms of government. Instead of their former ragged bare legged Captain (whom however they took care to keep innocent) they have now the honour to be governed by Don *José Sylva de Paz*, a Brigadier of the armies of *Portugal*. This Gentleman has with him a garrison of soldiers, and has consequently a more extensive and a better supported power than any of his predecessors, and as he wears better clothes, and lives more splendidly, and has besides a much better knowledge of the importance of money than they could ever pretend to: So he puts in practice certain methods of procuring it, with which they were utterly unacquainted. But it may be much doubted, if the inhabitants consider these methods as tending to promote either their interests, or that of their Sovereign the King of *Portugal*. This is certain, that his behaviour cannot but be extremely embarrassing to such *British* ships as touch there in their way to the *South-Seas*. For one of his practices was placing centinels at all the avenues, to prevent the people from selling us any refreshments, except at such exorbitant rates as we could not afford to give. His pretence for this extraordinary stretch of power was, that he was obliged to preserve their provisions for upwards of an hundred families, which they daily expected to reinforce their colony. Hence he appears to be no novice in his profession, by his readiness at inventing a plausible pretence for his interested management. However, this, though sufficiently provoking, was far from being the most exceptionable part of his conduct. For by the neighbourhood of the river *Plate*, a considerable smuggling traffic is carried on between the *Portuguese* and the *Spaniards*, especially in the exchanging gold for silver, by which both Princes are defrauded of their fifths, and in this prohibited commerce Don *José* was so deeply engaged,

engaged, that in order to ingratiate himself with his *Spanish* correspondents (for no other reason can be given for his procedure) he treacherously dispatched an express to *Buenos Ayres* in the river of *Plata*, where *Pizarro* then lay, with an account of our arrival, and the strength of our Squadron; particularly mentioning the number of ships, guns and men, and every circumstance which he could suppose our enemy desirous of being acquainted with. And the same perfidy every *British* cruizer may expect, who touches at *St. Catherine's*, while it is under the Government of *Don Jose Sylva de Paz*.

Thus much, with what we shall be necessitated to relate in the course of our own proceedings, may suffice as to the present state of *St. Catherine's*, and the character of its Governor. But as the reader may be desirous of knowing to what causes the late new modelling of this settlement is owing; to satisfy him in this particular, it will be necessary to give a short account of the adjacent continent of *Brazil*, and of the wonderful discoveries which have been made there within these last forty years, which, from a country of but mean estimation, has rendered it now perhaps the most considerable colony on the face of the globe.

This country was first discovered by *Americus Vesputio* a *Florentine*, who had the good fortune to be honoured with giving his name to the immense continent, some time before found out by *Columbus*. *Vesputio* being in the service of the *Portuguese*, it was settled and planted by that Nation, and with the other dominions of *Portugal*, devolved to the Crown of *Spain*, when that kingdom became subject to it. During the long war between *Spain* and the States of *Holland*, the *Dutch* possessed themselves of the northermost part of *Brazil*, and were masters of it for some years. But when the *Portuguese* revolted from the *Spanish* Government, this country took part in the revolt, and soon repossessed themselves of the places the *Dutch* had taken; since which time it has continued without interruption under the Crown of *Portugal*, being till the beginning of the present century, only productive of sugar and tobacco, and a few other commodities of very little account.

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But this country, which for many years was only considered for the produce of its plantations, has been lately discovered to abound with the two minerals, which mankind hold in the greatest esteem, and which they exert their utmost art and industry in acquiring, I mean, gold and diamonds. Gold was first found in the mountains, which lie adjacent to the city of *Rio Janeiro*. The occasion of its discovery is variously related, but the most common account is, that the *Indians*, lying on the back of the *Portuguese* settlements, were observed by the soldiers employed in an expedition against them to make use of this metal for their fish hooks; and their manner of procuring it being enquired into, it appeared that great quantities of it were annually washed from the hills, and left amongst the sand and gravel, which remained in the vallies after the running off, or evaporation of the water. It is now little more than forty years since any quantities of gold worth notice have been imported to *Europe* from *Brazil*; but since that time the annual imports from thence have been continually augmented by the discovery of places in other provinces, where it is to be met with as plentifully as at first about *Rio Janeiro*. And it is now said, that there is a small slender vein of it spread through all the country, at about twenty-four feet from the surface, but that this vein is too thin and poor to answer the expence of digging; however where the rivers or rains have had any course for a considerable time, there gold is always to be collected, the water having separated the metal from the earth, and deposited it in the sands, thereby saving the expences of digging: So that it is esteemed an infallible gain to be able to divert a stream from its channel, and to ransack its bed. From this account of gathering this metal, it should follow, that there are properly no gold mines in *Brazil*; and this the Governor of *Rio Grande* (who being at *St. Catherine's*, frequently visited Mr. *Anson*) did most confidently affirm, assuring us, that the gold was all collected either from rivers, or from the beds of torrents after floods. It is indeed asserted, that in the mountains, large rocks are found abounding with this metal; and I myself have seen the fragment of one of these rocks with a considerable lump of gold in-

tangled in it ; but even in this case, the workmen break off the rocks, and do not properly mine into them ; and the great expence in subsisting among these mountains, and afterwards in separating the metal from the stone, makes this method of procuring gold to be but rarely put in practice.

The examining the bottoms of rivers, and the gullies of torrents, and the washing the gold found therein from the sand and dirt, with which it is always mixed, are works performed by slaves, who are principally Negroes, kept in great numbers by the *Portuguese* for these purposes. The regulation of the duty of these slaves is singular : For they are each of them obliged to furnish their master with the eighth part of an ounce of gold *per diem* ; and if they are either so fortunate or industrious as to collect a greater quantity, the surplus is considered as their own property, and they have the liberty of disposing of it as they think fit. So that it is said some Negroes who have accidentally fallen upon rich washing places have themselves purchased slaves, and have lived afterwards in great splendor, their original master having no other demand on them than the daily supply of the forementioned eighth ; which as the *Portuguese* ounce is somewhat lighter than our troy ounce, may amount to about nine shillings sterling.

The quantity of gold thus collected in the *Brazils*, and returned annually to *Lisbon*, may be in some degree estimated from the amount of the King's fifth. This hath of late been esteemed one year with another to be one hundred and fifty arroves of 32 *l. Portuguese* weight each, which at 4 *l.* the troy ounce, makes very near 300,000 *l.* sterling ; and consequently the capital, of which this is the fifth, is about a million and a half sterling. It is obvious that the annual return of gold to *Lisbon* cannot be less than this, though it be difficult to determine how much it exceeds it ; perhaps we may not be very much mistaken in our conjecture, if we suppose the gold exchanged for silver with the *Spaniards* at *Buenos Ayres*, and what is brought privily to *Europe*, and escapes the duty, amounts to near half a million more, which will make the whole annual produce of the *Brazilian* gold near two millions sterling ; a prodigious

gious sum to be found in a country, which a few years since was not known to furnish a single grain.

I have already mentioned, that besides gold, this country does likewise produce diamonds. The discovery of these valuable stones is much more recent than that of gold, it being as yet scarce twenty years since the first were brought to *Europe*. They are found in the same manner as the gold, in the gullies of torrents and beds of rivers, but only in particular places, and not so universally spread through the country. They were often found in washing the gold before they were known to be diamonds, and were consequently thrown away with the sand and gravel separated from it. And it is very well remembered, that numbers of very large stones, which would have made the fortunes of the possessors, have passed unregarded through the hands of those, who now with impatience support the mortifying reflection. However, about twenty years since, a person acquainted with the appearance of rough diamonds, conceived that these pebbles, as they were then esteemed, were of the same kind : But it is said, that there was a considerable interval between the first starting of this opinion, and the confirmation of it by proper trials and examination, it proving difficult to persuade the inhabitants, that what they had been long accustomed to despise could be of the importance represented by this discovery ; and I have been informed, that in this interval, a Governor of one of their places procured a good number of these stones, which he pretended to make use of at cards to mark with, instead of counters. But it was at last confirmed by skilful Jewellers in *Europe*, consulted on this occasion, that the stones thus found in *Brazil* were truly diamonds, many of which were not inferior either in lustre, or any other quality to those of the *East-Indies*. On this determination the *Portuguese*, in the neighbourhood of those places where they had first been observed, set themselves to search for them with great assiduity. And they were not without great hopes of discovering considerable masses of them, as they found large rocks

of chriftal in many of the mountains, from whence the ftreams came which wafhed down the diamonds.

But it was foon represented to the King of *Portugal*, that if fuch plenty of diamonds fhould be met with as their fanguine conjectures feemed to indicate, this would fo debase their value, and diminish their eftimation, that befides ruining all the *Europeans*, who had any quantity of *Indian* diamonds in their poffeffion, it would render the difcovery itfelf of no importance, and would prevent his Majefty from receiving any advantages from it. And on thefe confiderations his Majefty has thought proper to refrain the general fearch of diamonds, and has erected a Diamond Company for that purpofe, with an exclusive charter. This Company, in confideration of a fum paid to the King, is vefted with the property of all diamonds found in *Brazil*: But to hinder their collecting too large quantities, and thereby reducing their value, they are prohibited from employing above eight hundred flaves in fearching after them. And to prevent any of his other fubjects from acting the fame part, and likewise to fecure the Company from being defrauded by the interfering of interlopers in their trade and property, he has depopulated a large town, and a confiderable diftrict round it, and has obliged the inhabitants, who are faid to amount to fix thoufand, to remove to another part of the country; for this town being in the neighbourhood of the diamonds, it was thought impoffible to prevent fuch a number of people, who were on the fpot, from frequently finuggling.

In confequence of thefe important difcoveries in *Brazil*, new laws, new governments, and new regulations have been eftablifhed in many parts of the country. For not long fince, a confiderable tract, poffeffed by a fet of inhabitants, who from their principal fettlement were called *Paulifts*, was almoft independent of the Crown of *Portugal*, to which it fcarcely acknowledged more than a nominal allegiance. Thefe *Paulifts* are faid to be descendants of thofe *Portuguefe*, who retired from the northern part of *Brazil*,  
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when it was invaded and possessed by the *Dutch*. As from the confusion of the times they were long neglected by their superiors, and were obliged to provide for their own security and defence, the necessity of their affairs produced a kind of government amongst them, which they found sufficient for the confined manner of life to which they were inured. And being thus habituated to their own regulations, they at length grew fond of their independency : So that rejecting and despising the mandates of the court of *Lisbon*, they were often engaged in a state of downright rebellion : And the mountains surrounding their country, and the difficulty of clearing the few passages that open into it, generally put it in their power to make their own terms before they submitted. But as gold was found to abound in this country of the *Paulists*, the present King of *Portugal* (during whose reign almost the whole discoveries I have mentioned were begun and compleated) thought it incumbent on him to reduce this province, which now became of great consequence, to the same dependency and obedience with the rest of the country, which I am told, he has at last, though with great difficulty, happily effected. And the same motives which induced his Majesty to undertake the reduction of the *Paulists*, has also occasioned the changes I have mentioned, to have taken place at the Island of *St. Catherine's*. For the Governor of *Rio Grande*, of whom I have already spoken, assured us, that in the neighbourhood of this Island there were considerable rivers which were found to be extremely rich, and that this was the reason that a garrison, a military Governor, and a new colony was settled there. And as the harbour at this Island is by much the securest and the most capacious of any on the coast, it is not improbable, if the riches of the neighbourhood answer their expectation, but it may become in time the principal settlement in *Brazil*, and the most considerable port in all South *America*.

Thus much I have thought necessary to insert, in relation to the present state of *Brazil*, and of the Island of *St. Catherine's*. For as this last place has been generally recommended as the most eligible port for our cruizers to refresh at, which are bound to the South-

*Seas*



*Seas*, I believed it to be my duty to instruct my countrymen in the hitherto unsuspected inconveniencies which attend that place. And as the *Brazilian* gold and diamonds are subjects, about which, from their novelty, very few particulars have been hitherto published, I conceived this account I had collected of them, would appear to the reader to be neither a trifling nor a useless digression. These subjects being thus dispatched, I shall now return to the series of our own proceedings.

When we first arrived at *St. Catherine's*, we were employed in refreshing our sick on shore, in wooding and watering the squadron, cleansing our ships, and examining and securing our masts and rigging, as I have already observed in the foregoing chapter. At the same time Mr. *Anson* gave directions, that the ships companies should be supplied with fresh meat, and that they should be victualled with whole allowance of all the kinds of provisions. In consequence of these orders, we had fresh beef sent on board us continually for our daily expence, and what was wanting to make up our allowance we received from our Victualler the *Anna Pink*, in order to preserve the provisions on board our squadron entire for our future service. The season of the year growing each day less favourable for our passage round *Cape Horn*, Mr. *Anson* was very desirous of leaving this place as soon as possible; and we were at first in hopes that our whole business would be done, and we should be in a readiness to sail in about a fortnight from our arrival; but on examining the *Tryal's* masts, we to our no small vexation, found inevitable employment for twice that time. For, on a survey, it was found that the main-mast was sprung at the upper wounding, though it was thought capable of being secured by a couple of fishes; but the fore-mast was reported to be unfit for service, and thereupon the Carpenters were sent into the woods, to endeavour to find a stick proper for a fore-mast. But after a search of four days, they returned without having been able to meet with any tree fit for the purpose. This obliged them to come to a second consultation about the old fore-mast, when it was agreed to endeavour to secure it by casing it with three fishes: And in this work the

Carpenters

Carpenters were employed till within a day or two of our sailing. In the mean time, the Commodore thinking it necessary to have a clean vessel on our arrival in the *South-Seas*, ordered the *Tryal* to be hove down, as this would not occasion any loss of time, but might be compleated while the Carpenters were refitting her masts, which was done on shore.

On the 27th of *December* we discovered a sail in the offing, and not knowing but she might be a *Spaniard*, the eighteen oared-boat was manned and armed, and sent under the command of our second Lieutenant, to examine her before she arrived within the protection of the forts. She proved to be a *Portuguese* Brigantine from *Rio Grande*. And though our Officer, as it appeared on inquiry, had behaved with the utmost civility to the Master, and had refused to accept a calf, which the master would have forced on him as a present: Yet the Governor took great offence at our sending our boat; and talked of it in a high strain, as a violation of the peace subsisting between the Crowns of *Great-Britain* and *Portugal*. We at first imputed this ridiculous blustering to no deeper a cause, than Don *José's* insolence; but as we found he proceeded so far as to charge our Officer with behaving rudely, and opening letters, and particularly with an attempt to take out of the vessel, by violence, the very calf which we knew he had refused to receive as a present, (a circumstance which we were satisfied the Governor was well acquainted with) we had hence reason to suspect, that he purposely sought this quarrel, and had more important motives for engaging in it, than the mere captious bias of his temper. What these motives were, it was not so easy for us to determine at that time; but as we afterwards found by letters which fell into our hands in the *South-Seas*, that he had dispatched an express to *Buenos Ayres*, where *Pizarro* then lay, with an account of our Squadron's arrival at *St. Catherine's*, together with the most ample and circumstantial intelligence of our force and condition, we thence conjectured that Don *José* had raised this groundless clamour, only to prevent our visiting the Brigantine when she should

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put to sea again, lest we might there find proofs of his perfidious behaviour, and perhaps at the same time discover the secret of his smuggling correspondence with his neighbouring Governors, and the *Spaniards* at *Buenos Ayres*. But to proceed,

It was near a month before the *Tryal* was refitted; for not only her lower masts were defective, as hath been already mentioned, but her main top-mast and fore-yard were likewise decayed and rotten. While this work was carrying on, the other ships of the squadron fixed new standing rigging, and set up a sufficient number of preventer shrouds to each mast, to secure them in the most effectual manner. And in order to render the ships stiffer, and to enable them to carry more sail abroad, and to prevent their straining their upper works in hard gales of wind, each Captain had orders given him to strike down some of their great guns into the hold. These precautions being complied with, and each ship having taken in as much wood and water as there was room for, the *Tryal* was at last compleated, and the whole squadron was ready for the sea: On which the tents on shore were struck, and all the sick were received on board. And here we had a melancholy proof how much the healthiness of this place had been over-rated by former writers, for we found that though the *Centurion* alone had buried no less than twenty-eight men since our arrival, yet, the number of her sick was in the same interval increased from eighty to ninety-six. When our crews were embarked, and every thing was prepared for our departure, the Commodore made a signal for all Captains, and delivered them their orders, containing the successive places of rendezvous from hence to the coast of *Chili*. And then, on the next day, being the 18th of *January*, the signal was made for weighing, and the squadron put to sea, leaving without regret this Island of *St. Catherine's*; where we had been so extremely disappointed in our refreshments, in our accommodations, and in the humane and friendly offices which we had been taught to expect in a place, which hath been so much celebrated for its hospitality, freedom, and convenience.

## C H A P. VI.

The run from *St. Catherine's* to port *St. Julian*, with some account of that port, and of the country to the southward of the river of *Plate*.

**I**N leaving *St. Catherine's*, we left the last amicable port we proposed to touch at, and were now proceeding to an hostile, or at best, a desert and inhospitable coast. And as we were to expect a more boisterous climate to the southward than any we had yet experienced, not only our danger of separation would by this means be much greater than it had been hitherto, but other accidents of a more mischievous nature were likewise to be apprehended, and as much as possible to be provided against. Mr. *Anson*, therefore in appointing the various stations at which the ships of the squadron were to rendezvous, had considered, that it was possible his own ship might be disabled from getting round *Cape Horn*, or might be lost, and had given proper directions, that even in that case the expedition should not be abandoned. For the orders delivered to the Captains, the day before we sailed from *St. Catherine's*, were, that in case of separation, which they were with the utmost care to endeavour to avoid, the first place of rendezvous should be the bay of port *St. Julian*; describing the place from Sir *John Narborough's* account of it: There they were to supply themselves with as much salt as they could take in, both for their own use, and for the use of the squadron; and if, after a stay of ten days, they were not joined by the Commodore, they were then to proceed through *Streights Le Maire* round *Cape Horn*, into the *South-Seas*, where the next place of rendezvous was to be the Island of *Nuestra Senora del Socoro*, in the latitude of  $45^{\circ}$  South, and longitude from the *Lizard*  $71^{\circ} : 12'$  West. They were to bring

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this Island to bear E. N. E, and to cruize from five to twelve leagues distance from it, as long as their store of wood and water would permit, both which they were to expend with the utmost frugality. And when they were under an absolute necessity of a fresh supply, they were to stand in, and endeavour to find out an anchoring place ; and in case they could not, and the weather made it dangerous to supply their ships by standing off and on, they were then to make the best of their way to the Island of *Juan Fernandes*, in the latitude of  $33^{\circ} : 37'$  South. At this Island, as soon as they had recruited their wood and water, they were to continue cruising off the anchoring place for fifty-six days ; in which time, if they were not joined by the Commodore, they might conclude that some accident had befallen him, and they were forthwith to put themselves under the command of the senior Officer, who was to use his utmost endeavours to annoy the enemy both by sea and land. With these views their new Commodore was to continue in those seas as long as his provisions lasted, or as long as they were recruited by what he should take from the enemy, reserving only a sufficient quantity to carry him and the ships under his command to *Macao*, at the entrance of the river of *Canton* on the coast of *Cbina*, where having supplied himself with a new stock of provisions, he was thence, without delay, to make the best of his way to *England*. And as it was found impossible as yet to unload our Victualler the *Anna Pink*, the Commodore gave the Master of her the same rendezvous, and the same orders to put himself under the command of the remaining senior Officer.

Under these orders the Squadron sailed from *St. Catherine's* on *Sunday* the 18th of *January*, as hath been already mentioned in the preceding chapter. The next day we had very squally weather, attended with rain, lightning and thunder, but it soon became fair again with light breezes, and continued thus till *Wednesday* evening, when it blew fresh again ; and encreasing all night, by eight the next morning it became a most violent storm, and we had with it so thick a fog, that it was impossible to see at the distance  
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of two ships length, so that the whole Squadron disappeared. On this, a signal was made, by firing guns, to bring too with the lar-board tacks, the wind being then due East. We ourselves immediately handed the top-sails, bunted the main-sail, and lay too under a reefed mizen till noon, when the fog dispersed, and we soon discovered all the ships of the Squadron, except the *Pearl*, who did not join us till near a month afterwards. Indeed the *Tryal* Sloop was a great way to leeward, having lost her main-mast in the squall, and having been obliged, for fear of bilging, to cut away the raft. We therefore bore down with the Squadron to her relief, and the *Gloucester* was ordered to take her in tow; for the weather did not entirely abate till the day after, and even then, a great swell continued from the eastward, in consequence of the preceding storm.

After this accident we stood to the southward with little interruption, and here we experienced the same setting of the current, which we had observed before our arrival at *St. Catherine's*; that is, we generally found ourselves to the southward of our reckoning, by about twenty miles each day. This deviation, with a little inequality, lasted till we had passed the latitude of the river of *Plate*; and even then, we discovered that the same current, however difficult to be accounted for, did yet undoubtedly take place; for we were not satisfied in deducing it from the error in our reckoning, but we actually tried it more than once, when a calm made it practicable.

As soon as we had passed the latitude of the river of *Plate*, we had soundings which continued all along the coast of *Patagonia*. These soundings, when well ascertained, being of great use in determining the position of the ship, and we having tried them more frequently, and in greater depths, and with more attention, than I believe hath been done before us; I shall recite our observations as succinctly as I can, referring to the chart hereafter inserted in the ninth chapter of this book, for a general view of the whole. In the latitude of  $36^{\circ} : 52'$ , we had sixty fathom of water, with a bottom of fine black and grey sand; from thence to  $39^{\circ} : 55'$ , we varied our depths from fifty to eighty fathom, though we had constantly the same bottom as before: between

the last mentioned latitude, and  $43^{\circ} : 16'$ , we had only fine grey sand, with the same variation of depths, except that we once or twice lessened our water to forty fathom. After this, we continued in forty fathom for about half a degree, having a bottom of coarse sand and broken shells, at which time we were in sight of land, and not above seven leagues from it: As we edged from the land we met with variety of soundings; first black sand, then muddy, and soon after rough ground with stones; but when we had encreased our water to forty-eight fathom, we had a muddy bottom to the latitude of  $46^{\circ} : 10'$ . Hence drawing towards the shore, we had first thirty-six fathom, and still kept shoaling our water, till at length we came into twelve fathom, having constantly small stones and pebbles at the bottom. Part of this time we had a view of Cape *Blanco*, which lies in about the latitude of  $47^{\circ} : 10'$ , and longitude West from *London*  $69^{\circ}$ . This is the most remarkable land upon the coast: Two very exact views of it are exhibited in the annexed plate, where (*b*) represents the Cape itself; these draughts will fully enable future Voyagers to distinguish it. Steering from hence S. by E. nearly, we, in a run of about thirty leagues deepned our water to fifty fathom, without once altering the bottom; and then drawing towards the shore with a S. W. course, varying rather to the westward, we had constantly a sandy bottom, till our coming into thirty fathom, where we had again a sight of land distant from us, about eight leagues, lying in the latitude of  $48^{\circ} : 31'$ . We made this land on the 17th of *February*, and at five that afternoon, we came to an anchor having the same soundings as before, in the latitude of  $48^{\circ} : 58'$ , the southermost land then in view bearing S. S. W, the northermost N.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E, a small Island N. W, and the westernmost hummock W. S. W. In this station we found the tide to set S. by W; and weighing again at five the next morning, we, an hour afterwards, discovered a sail, upon which the *Severn* and *Gloucester* were both directed to give chase; but we soon perceived it to be the *Pearl*, which separated from us a few days after we left *St. Catherine's*, and on this we made a signal for the *Severn* to rejoin the squadron,







leaving the *Gloucester* alone in the pursuit. And now we were surprized to see that on the *Gloucester's* approach, the people on board the *Pearl* increased their sail, and stood from her. However, the *Gloucester* came up with them, but found them with their hammocks in their nettings, and every thing ready for an engagement. At two in the afternoon the *Pearl* joined us, and running up under our stern, Lieutenant *Salt* hailed the Commodore, and acquainted him that Captain *Kidd* died on the 31st of *January*. He likewise informed us, that he had seen five large ships the 10th instant, which he for some time imagined to be our squadron: So that he suffered the commanding ship, which wore a red broad pendant, exactly resembling that of the Commodore, at the main top mast head, to come within gun-shot of him before he discovered his mistake; but then finding it not to be the *Centurion*, he haled close upon the wind, and crowded from them with all his sail, and standing cross a ripling, where they hesitated to follow him, he happily escaped. He made them to be five *Spanish* men of war, one of them exceedingly like the *Gloucester*, which was the occasion of his apprehensions when the *Gloucester* chased him. By their appearance he thought they consisted of two ships of seventy guns, two of fifty, and one of forty guns. It seems the whole squadron continued in chace of him all that day, but at night finding they could not get near him, they gave over the chace, and directed their course to the southward.

Had it not been for the necessity we were under of refitting the *Tryal*, this piece of intelligence would have prevented our making any stay at *St. Julian's*; but as it was impossible for that sloop to proceed round the Cape in her present condition, some stay there was inevitable, and therefore the same evening we came to an anchor again in twenty-five fathom water, the bottom a mixture of mud and sand, and the high hummock bearing S. W. by W. And weighing at nine in the morning, we sent the two Cutters belonging to the *Centurion* and *Severn* in shore, to discover the harbour of *St. Julian*, while the ships kept standing along the coast.

coast, about the distance of a league from the land. At six o'clock we anchored in the bay of *St. Julian*, in nineteen fathom, the bottom muddy ground with sand, the northermost land in sight bearing N. and by E, the southermost S.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E, and the high hummock, to which Sir *John Narborough* formerly gave the name of *Wood's Mount*, W. S. W. Soon after, the Cutter returned on board having discovered the harbour, which did not appear to us in our situation, the northermost point shutting in upon the southermost, and in appearance closing the entrance. To facilitate the knowledge of this coast to future Navigators, there are two views annexed; the first of the land of *Patagonia*, to the northward of port *St. Julian*, where (*w*) is *Wood's Mount*, and the bay of *St. Julian* lies round the point (*c*). The second view is of the bay itself; and here again (*w*) is *Wood's Mount*, (*a*) is cape *St. Julian*, and (*b*) the port or river's mouth.

Being come to an anchor in this bay of *St. Julian*, principally with a view of refitting the *Tryal*, the Carpenters were immediately employed in that business, and continued so during our whole stay at the place. The *Tryal's* main-mast having been carried away about twelve feet below the cap, they contrived to make the remaining part of the mast serve again; and the *Wager* was ordered to supply her with a spare main top-mast, which the Carpenters converted into a new fore-mast. And I cannot help observing, that this accident to the *Tryal's* mast, which gave us so much uneasiness at that time, on account of the delay it occasioned, was, in all probability, the means of preserving the sloop, and all her crew. For before this, her masts, how well soever proportioned to a better climate, were much too lofty for these high southern latitudes: So that, had they weathered the preceding storm, it would have been impossible for them to have stood against those seas and tempests we afterwards encountered in passing round *Cape Horn*, and the loss of masts in that boisterous climate, would scarcely have been attended with less than the loss of the vessel, and of every man on board her; since it would have been impracticable for the other ships to have  
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given them any relief, during the continuance of those impetuous storms.

Whilst we stayed at this place, the Commodore appointed the Honourable Captain *Murray* to succeed to the *Pearl*, and Captain *Cheap* to the *Wager*, and he promoted Mr. *Charles Saunders*, his first Lieutenant, to the command of the *Tryal* Sloop: But Captain *Saunders* lying dangerously ill of a fever on board the *Centurion*, and it being the opinion of the Surgeons, that the removing him on board his own ship, in his present condition, might tend to the hazard of his life; Mr. *Anson* gave an order to Mr. *Saumarez*, first Lieutenant of the *Centurion*, to act as Master and Commander of the *Tryal*, during the Illness of Captain *Saunders*.

Here the Commodore too, in order to ease the expedition of all unnecessary expence, held a farther consultation with his Captains about unloading and discharging the *Anna Pink*; but they represented to him, that they were so far from being in a condition of taking any part of her loading on board, that they had still great quantities of provisions in the way of their guns between decks, and that their ships were withal so very deep, that they were not fit for action without being cleared. This put the Commodore under a necessity of retaining the *Pink* in the service; and as it was apprehended we should certainly meet with the *Spanish* Squadron, in passing the Cape, Mr. *Anson* thought it adviseable to give orders to the Captains, to put all their provisions, which were in the way of their guns, on board the *Anna Pink*, and to remount such of their guns as had formerly, for the ease of their ships, been ordered into the hold.

This bay of St. *Julian*, where we are now at anchor, being a convenient rendezvous, in case of separation, for all cruizers bound to the southward, and the whole coast of *Patagonia*, from the river of *Plate* to the Straights of *Magellan*, lying nearly parallel to their usual route, a short account of the singularity of this country, with a particular description of port St. *Julian*, may perhaps be neither unacceptable to the curious, nor unworthy the attention of future Navigators,

Navigators, as some of them, by unforeseen accidents, may be obliged to run in with the land, and to make some stay on this coast, in which case the knowledge of the country, its produce and inhabitants, cannot but be of the utmost consequence to them.

To begin then with the tract of country usually stiled *Patagonia*. This is the name often given to the southernmost part of South America, which is unpossessed by the *Spaniards*, extending from their settlements to the Streights of *Magellan*. This country, on the east side, is extremely remarkable, for a peculiarity not to be paralleled in any other known part of the globe; for though the whole territory to the northward of the river of *Plate* is full of wood, and stored with an immense quantity of large timber trees, yet to the southward of the river no trees of any kind are to be met with, except a few peach-trees, first planted and cultivated by the *Spaniards* in the neighbourhood of *Buenos Ayres*: So that on the whole eastern coast of *Patagonia*, extending near four hundred leagues in length, and reaching as far back as any discoveries have yet been made, no other wood has been found than a few insignificant shrubs. Sir *John Narborough* in particular, who was sent out, by King *Charles* the second, expressly to examine this country, and the Streights of *Magellan*, and who, in pursuance of his orders, wintered upon this coast in port *St. Julian* and port *Desire*, in the year 1670; Sir *John Narborough*, I say, tells us, that he never saw a stick of wood in the country, large enough to make the handle of an hatchet.

But though the country be so destitute of wood, it abounds with pasture. For the land appears in general to be made up of downs of a light dry gravelly soil, and produces great quantities of long coarse grass, which grows in tufts interspersed with large barren spots of gravel between them. This grass, in many places, feeds immense herds of cattle: For the *Spaniards* at *Buenos Ayres*, having, soon after their first settling there, brought over a few black cattle from *Europe*, they have thriven prodigiously by the plenty of herbage which they every where met with, and are now increased to that degree, and are extended

so far into different parts of *Patagonia* that they are not considered as private property ; but many thousands at a time are slaughtered every year by the Hunters, only for their hides and tallow. The manner of killing these cattle, being a practice peculiar to that part of the world merits a more circumstantial description. The Hunters employed on this occasion being all of them mounted on horseback, (and both the *Spaniards* and *Indians* in that part of the world, are usually most excellent horsemen) they arm themselves with a kind of a spear, which, at its end, instead of a blade fixed in the same line with the wood, in the usual manner, has its blade fixed across; with this instrument they ride at a beast, and surround him ; when the Hunter that comes behind him hamstring him : And as after this operation the beast soon tumbles, without being able to raise himself again, they leave him on the ground, and pursue others, whom they serve in the same manner. Sometimes there is a second party, who attend the Hunters, to skin the cattle as they fall: But it is said, that at other times the Hunters chuse to let them languish in torment till the next day, from an opinion that the anguish, which the animal in the mean time endures, may burst the lymphaticks, and thereby facilitate the separation of the skin from the carcass : And though their Priests have loudly condemned this most barbarous practice, and have gone so far, if my memory does not fail me, as to excommunicate those who follow it, yet all their efforts to put an entire stop to it have hitherto proved ineffectual.

Besides the numbers of cattle which are every year slaughtered for their hides and tallow, in the manner already described, it is often necessary for the uses of agriculture, and for other purposes to take them alive, without wounding them : This is performed with a most wonderful and almost incredible dexterity, and principally by the use of a machine, which the *English*, who have resided at *Buenos Ayres*, generally denominated a lash. It is made of a thong of several fathoms in length, and very strong, with a running noose at one end of it : This the Hunters (who in this case are also mounted on horseback) take in their right hands, it being



first properly coiled up, and having its end opposite to the noose fastened to the saddle; and thus prepared they ride at a herd of cattle. When they arrive within a certain distance of a beast, they throw their thong at him with such exactness, that they never fail of fixing the noose about his horns. The beast, when he finds himself entangled, generally runs, but the horse, being swifter, attends him, and prevents the thong from being too much strained, till a second Hunter, who follows the game, throws another noose about one of its hind legs; and this being done, both horses (for they are trained to this practice) instantly turn different ways, in order to strain the two thongs in contrary directions, on which the beast, by their opposite pulls, is presently overthrown, and then the horses stop, keeping the thongs still upon the stretch: Being thus on the ground, and incapable of resistance, (for he is extended between the two horses) the Hunters alight, and secure him in such a manner, that they afterwards easily convey him to whatever place they please. They in like manner noose horses, and, as it is said, even tigers; and however strange this last circumstance may appear, there are not wanting persons of credit who assert it. Indeed, it must be owned, that the address both of the *Spaniards* and *Indians* in that part of the world, in the use of this lash or noose, and the certainty with which they throw it, and fix it on any intended part of the beast at a considerable distance, are matters only to be believed, from the repeated and concurrent testimony of all who have frequented that country, and might reasonably be questioned, did it rely on a single report, or had it ever been contradicted or denied by any one who had resided at *Buenos Ayres*.

The cattle which are killed in the manner I have already observed, are slaughtered only for their hides and tallow, to which sometimes are added their tongues, but the rest of their flesh is left to putrify, or to be devoured by the birds and wild beasts. The greatest part of this carion falls to the share of the wild dogs, of which there are immense numbers to be found in that country. These are supposed to have been originally produced by *Spanish* dogs

dogs from *Buenos Ayres*, who, allured by the great quantity of carion, and the facility they had by that means of subsisting, left their Masters, and ran wild amongst the cattle; for they are plainly of the breed of the *European* dogs, an animal not originally found in *America*. But though these dogs are said to be some thousands in a company, they hitherto neither diminish nor prevent the increase of the cattle; not daring to attack the herds, by reason of the numbers which constantly feed together; but contenting themselves with the carion left them by the Hunters, and perhaps now and then with a few stragglers, who, by accident, are separated from the main body they belong to.

Besides the wild cattle which have spread themselves in such vast herds from *Buenos Ayres* towards the southward, the same country is in like manner furnished with horses. These too were first brought from *Spain*, and are also prodigiously increased, and run wild to a much greater distance than the black cattle: And though many of them are excellent, yet their number makes them of very little value; the best of them being often sold, in the neighbouring settlements, where money is plenty and commodities very dear, for not more than a dollar a-piece. It is not as yet certain how far to the southward these herds of wild cattle and horses have extended themselves; but there is some reason to conjecture, that stragglers of both kinds are to be met with very near the Straights of *Magellan*; and they will in time doubtless fill all the southern part of the Continent with their breed, which cannot fail of proving of considerable advantage to such ships as may touch upon the coast; for the horses themselves are said to be very good eating, and as such, are preferred by some of the *Indians* even before the black cattle. But whatever plenty of flesh provisions may be hereafter found here, there is one material refreshment which this eastern side of *Patagonia* seems to be very defective in, and that is fresh water; for the land being generally of a nitrous and saline nature, the ponds and streams are frequently brackish. However, as good water has been found there, though

in small quantities, it is not improbable, but on a further search, this inconvenience may be removed.

To the account already given, I must add, that there are in all parts of this country a good number of *Vicunnas* or *Peruvian* sheep; but these, by reason of their shyness and swiftness, are killed with difficulty. On the eastern coast too, there are found immense quantities of seals, and a vast variety of sea-fowl, amongst which the most remarkable are the *Penguins*; they are in size and shape like a goose, but instead of wings they have short stumps like fins, which are of no use to them, except in the water; their bills are narrow, like that of an *Albitrofs*, and they stand and walk in an erect posture. From this, and their white bellies, Sir *John Narborough* has whimsically likened them to little children standing up in white aprons.

The inhabitants of this eastern coast (to which I have all along hitherto confined my relation) appear to be but few, and have rarely been seen more than two or three at a time, by any ships that have touched here. We, during our stay at the port of *St. Julian*, saw none. However, towards *Buenos Ayres* they are sufficiently numerous, and oftentimes very troublesome to the *Spaniards*; but there the greater breadth and variety of the country, and a milder climate, yield them a better protection; for in that place the Continent is between three and four hundred leagues in breadth, whereas at port *St. Julian* it is little more than an hundred: So that I conceive the same *Indians* who frequent the western coast of *Patagonia* and the Streights of *Magellan*, often ramble to this side. As the *Indians* near *Buenos Ayres* exceed the southern *Indians* in numbers, so they greatly surpass them in activity and spirit, and seem in their manners to be nearly allied to those gallant *Chilian Indians*, who have long set the whole *Spanish* power at defiance, have often ravaged their country, and remain to this hour independent. For the *Indians* about *Buenos Ayres* have learnt to be excellent horsemen, and are extremely expert in the management of all cutting weapons, though ignorant of the use of fire-arms, which  
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the *Spaniards* are very solicitous to keep out of their hands. And of the vigour and resolution of these *Indians*, the behaviour of *Orellana* and his followers, whom we have formerly mentioned, is a memorable instance. Indeed were we disposed to aim at the utter subversion of the *Spanish* power in *America*, no means seem more probable to effect it, than due encouragement and assistance given to these *Indians* and those of *Chili*.

Thus much may suffice in relation to the eastern coast of *Patagonia*. The western coast is of less extent ; and by reason of the *Andes* which skirt it, and stretch quite down to the water, is a very rocky and dangerous shore. However, I shall be hereafter necessitated to make further mention of it, and therefore shall not enlarge thereon at this time, but shall conclude this account with a short description of the harbour of *St. Julian*, the general form of which may be conceived from the annexed sketch. But it must be remembered, that the bar, which is there marked at the entrance, is often shifting, and has many holes in it. The tide flows here N. and S, and at full and change, rises four fathom.

We, on our first arrival here, sent an Officer on shore to the salt-pond, marked (D) in the plan, in order to procure a quantity of salt for the use of the squadron, Sir *John Narborough* having observed, when he was here, that the salt produced in that place was very white and good, and that in *February* there was enough of it to fill a thousand ships ; but our Officer returned with a sample which was very bad, and he told us, that even of this there was but little to be got ; I suppose the weather had been more rainy than ordinary, and had destroyed it. To give the reader a better idea of this port, and of the adjacent country, to which the whole coast I have described bears a great resemblance, I have inserted two very accurate views, one of them representing the appearance of the country, when looking up the river ; the other, being a view taken from the same spot, but the observer is now supposed to turn round opposite to his former situation, and consequently this is the representation of the appearance of the country down the river, betwixt the station of the observer, and the river's mouth.

## C H A P. VII.

Departure from the bay of St. *Julian*, and the passage from thence to Streights *Le Maire*.

THE *Tryal* being nearly refitted, which was our principal occupation at this bay of St. *Julian*, and the sole occasion of our stay, the Commodore thought it necessary, as we were now directly bound for the *South-Seas* and the enemy's coasts, to fix the plan of his first operations: And therefore, on the 24th of *February*, a signal was made for all Captains, and a Council of war was held on board the *Centurion*, at which were present the Honourable *Edward Legg*, Captain *Matthew Mitchell*, the Honourable *George Murray*, Captain *David Cheap*, together with Colonel *Mordaunt Cracherode*, Commander of the land-forces. At this Council Mr. *Anson* proposed, that their first attempt, after their arrival in the *South-Seas*, should be the attack of the town and harbour of *Baldivia*, the principal frontier of the district of *Cbili*; Mr. *Anson* informing them, at the same time, that it was an article contained in his Majesty's instructions to him, to endeavour to secure some port in the *South-Seas*, where the ships of the squadron might be careened and refitted. To this proposition made by the Commodore, the Council unanimously and readily agreed; and in consequence of this resolution, new instructions were given to the Captains of the squadron, by which, though they were still directed, in case of separation, to make the best of their way to the Island of *Nuestra Senora del Socoro*, yet (notwithstanding the orders they had formerly given them at St. *Catherine's*) they were to cruise off that Island only ten days; from whence, if not joined by the Commodore, they were to proceed, and cruise off the harbour of *Baldivia*, making the land between the latitudes of  $40^{\circ}$ , and  $40^{\circ} 30'$ , and taking care to keep to the southward of the port; and, if

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in fourteen days they were not joined by the rest of the squadron, they were then to quit this station, and to direct their course to the Island of *Juan Fernandes*, after which they were to regulate their further proceedings by their former orders. The same directions were also given to the Master of the *Anna Pink*, who was not to fail in answering the signals made by any ship of the squadron, and was to be very careful to destroy his papers and orders, if he should be so unfortunate, as to fall into the hands of the enemy. And as the separation of the squadron might prove of the utmost prejudice to his Majesty's service, each Captain was ordered to give it in charge to the respective Officers of the watch, not to keep their ship at a greater distance from the *Centurion* than two miles, as they would answer it at their peril; and if any Captain should find his ship beyond the distance specified, he was to acquaint the Commodore with the name of the Officer, who had thus neglected his duty.

These necessary regulations being established, and the *Trial* Sloop compleated, the squadron weighed on *Friday* the 27th of *February*, at seven in the morning, and stood to the sea; the *Gloucester* indeed found a difficulty in purchasing her anchor, and was left a considerable way a-stern, so that in the night we fired several guns as a signal to her Captain to make sail, but he did not come up to us till the next morning, when we found that they had been obliged to cut their cable, and leave their best bower behind them. At ten in the morning, the day after our departure, *Wood's Mount*, the highland over *St. Julian*, bore from us N. by W. distant ten leagues, and we had fifty-two fathom of water. And now standing to the southward, we had great expectation of falling in with *Pizarro's* squadron; for, during our stay at port *St. Julian*, there had generally been hard gales between the W. N. W. and S. W, so that we had reason to conclude the *Spaniards* had gained no ground upon us in that interval. Indeed it was the prospect of meeting with them, that had occasioned our Commodore to be so very solicitous to prevent the separation of our ships: For, had we  
 been



been solely intent upon getting round Cape *Horn* in the shortest time, the properest method for this purpose would have been, to have ordered each ship to have made the best of her way to the rendezvous, without waiting for the rest.

From our departure from St. *Julian* to the 4th of *March*, we had little wind, with thick hazy weather, and some rain ; and our soundings were generally from forty to fifty fathom, with a bottom of black and grey sand, sometimes intermixed with pebble stones. On the 4th of *March* we were in sight of Cape *Virgin Mary*, and not more than six or seven leagues distant from it : This Cape is the northern boundary of the entrance of the Streights of *Magellan*, it lies in the latitude of  $52^{\circ} : 21'$  South, and longitude from *London*  $71^{\circ} : 44'$  West, and seems to be a low flat land, ending in a point. And for a direction to such ships as may, by particular reasons, be induced hereafter to pass through those Streights into the *South-Seas*, I have annexed a very accurate draught of its appearance, where (*a*) represents the Cape itself. Off this Cape our depth of water was from thirty-five to forty-eight fathom. The afternoon of this day was very bright and clear, with small breezes of wind, inclinable to a calm, and most of the Captains took the opportunity of this favourable weather to pay a visit to the Commodore ; but while they were in company together, they were all greatly alarmed by a sudden flame, which burst out on board the *Gloucester*, and which was succeeded by a cloud of smoke. However, they were soon relieved from their apprehensions, by receiving information, that the blast was occasioned by a spark of fire from the forge lighting on some gunpowder and other combustibles, which an Officer on board was preparing for use, in case we should fall in with the *Spanish* fleet ; and that it had been extinguished, without any damage to the ship.

We here found what was constantly verified by all our observations in these high latitudes, that fair weather was always of an exceeding short duration, and that when it was remarkably fine, it was a certain preface of a succeeding storm, for the calm and  
sunshine





sunshine of our afternoon ended in a most turbulent night, the wind freshning from the S. W. as the night came on, and encreasing its violence continually till nine in the morning the next day, when it blew so hard, that we were obliged to bring too with the squadron, and to continue under a reefed mizen till eleven at night, having in that time from forty-three to fifty-seven fathom water, with black sand and gravel ; and by an observation we had at noon, we concluded a current had set us twelve miles to the southward of our reckoning. Towards midnight, the wind abating, we made sail again ; and steering South, we discovered in the morning for the first time the land, called *Terra del Fuego*, stretching from the S. by W, to the S. E.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E. This indeed afforded us but a very uncomfortable prospect, it appearing of a stupendous height, covered every where with snow. And though the dreariness of this scene can be but imperfectly represented by any Drawing, yet the annexed plate contains so exact a delineation of the form of the country, that it may greatly assist the reader in framing some idea of this uncouth and rugged coast. In this Drawing (a) is the opening of Straights *Le Maire*, (b) Cape St. Diego, (1) (2) (3) the three hills, called the three brothers, and (4) *Montegorda*, an highland which lies up in the country, and appears over the three brothers. We steered along this shore all day, having soundings from forty to fifty fathom, with stones and gravel. And as we intended to pass through Straights *Le Maire* next day, we lay too at night, that we might not overshoot them, and took this opportunity to prepare ourselves for the tempestuous climate we were soon to be engaged in ; with which view, we employed ourselves good part of the night in bending an entire new suit of sails to the yards. At four the next morning, being the 7th of *March*, we made sail, and at eight saw the land ; and soon after we began to open the Straights, at which time Cape St. *James* bore from us E. S. E, Cape St. *Vincent* S. E.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E, the middlemost of the three brothers S. and by W, *Montegorda* South, and Cape St. *Bartholomew*, which is the southernmost point of *Staten-land*, E. S. E.

The appearance of the Straights in this situation, is represented in the annexed plate, where (a) is part of *Staten-land*, (b) Cape St. *Bartholomew*, (c) part of *Terra del Fuego*, (d) port *Maurice*, and (e) supposed to be *Valentine's bay*, or the bay of good success. And here I must observe, that though *Frezier* has given us a very correct prospect of the part of *Terra del Fuego*, which borders on the Straights, yet he has omitted that of *Staten-land*, which forms the opposite shore : Hence we found it difficult to determine exactly where the Straights lay, till they began to open to our view ; and for want of this, if we had not happened to have coasted a considerable way along shore, we might have missed the Straights, and have got to the eastward of *Staten-land* before we knew it. This is an accident that has happened to many ships, particularly as *Frezier* mentions, to the *Incarnation* and *Concord* ; who intending to pass through Straights *Le Maire*, were deceived by three hills on *Staten-land* like the three brothers, and some creeks resembling those of *Terra del Fuego*, and thereby over-shot the Straights. To prevent these accidents for the future, there is inserted the West prospect of *Staten-land*, where (a) is Cape St. *Diego*, on *Terra del Fuego*, (b) Cape St. *Bartholomew*, on *Staten-land*. This Drawing will hereafter render it impossible for any ships to be deceived in the manner abovementioned, or to find any difficulty in distinguishing the points of land by which the Straights are formed.

And on occasion of this prospect of *Staten-land* here inserted, I cannot but remark, that though *Terra del Fuego* had an aspect extremely barren and desolate, yet this Island of *Staten-land* far surpasses it, in the wildness and horror of its appearance : It seeming to be entirely composed of inaccessible rocks, without the least mixture of earth or mold between them. These rocks terminate in a vast number of ragged points, which spire up to a prodigious height, and are all of them covered with everlasting snow ; the points themselves are on every side surrounded with frightful precipices, and often overhang in a most astonishing manner ; and the hills which bear them, are generally separated from each other by  
narrow





narrow clefts, which appear as if the country had been frequently rent by earthquakes; for these chasms are nearly perpendicular, and extend through the substance of the main rocks, almost to their very bottoms: So that nothing can be imagined more savage and gloomy, than the whole aspect of this coast. But to proceed:

I have above mentioned, that on the 7th of *March*, in the morning, we opened Streights *Le Maire*, and soon after, or about ten o'clock, the *Pearl* and the *Tryal* being ordered to keep a-head of the squadron, we entered them with fair weather and a brisk gale, and were hurried through by the rapidity of the tide in about two hours, though they are between seven and eight leagues in length. As these Streights are often esteemed to be the boundary between the *Atlantick* and *Pacifick* Oceans, and as we presumed we had nothing before us from hence but an open sea, till we arrived on those opulent coasts where all our hopes and wishes centered, we could not help perswading ourselves, that the greatest difficulty of our voyage was now at an end, and that our most sanguine dreams were upon the point of being realised; and hence we indulged our imaginations in those romantick schemes which the fancied possession of the *Chilian* gold and *Peruvian* silver might be conceived to inspire. These joyous ideas were considerably heightened by the brightness of the sky and serenity of the weather, which was indeed most remarkably pleasing; for though the winter was now advancing apace, yet the morning of this day, in its brilliancy and mildness, gave place to none we had seen since our departure from *England*. Thus animated by these flattering delusions, we passed those memorable Streights, ignorant of the dreadful calamities which were then impending, and just ready to break upon us; ignorant that the time drew near, when the squadron would be separated never to unite again, and that this day of our passage was the last chearful day that the greatest part of us would ever live to enjoy.



## C H A P. VIII.

From Streights *Le Maire* to Cape *Noir*.

WE had scarcely reached the southern extremity of the Streights of *Le Maire*, when our flattering hopes were instantly lost in the apprehensions of immediate destruction : For before the sternmost ships of the Squadron were clear of the Streights, the serenity of the sky was suddenly obscured, and we observed all the presages of an impending storm ; and presently the wind shifted to the southward, and blew in such violent squalls, that we were obliged to hand our top-sails, and reef our main-sail ; whilst the tide too, which had hitherto favoured us, at once turned furiously against us, and drove us to the eastward with prodigious rapidity, so that we were in great anxiety for the *Wager* and the *Antha Pink*, the two sternmost vessels, fearing they would be dashed to pieces against the shore of *Staten-land* : Nor were our apprehensions without foundation, for it was with the utmost difficulty they escaped. And now the whole Squadron, instead of pursuing their intended course to the S. W. were driven to the eastward by the united force of the storm, and of the currents ; so that next day in the morning we found ourselves near seven leagues to the eastward of Streights *Le Maire*, which then bore from us N. W. The violence of the current, which had set us with so much precipitation to the eastward, together with the fierceness and constancy of the westerly winds, soon taught us to consider the doubling of Cape *Horn* as an enterprize, that might prove too mighty for our efforts, though some amongst us had lately treated the difficulties which former voyagers were said to have met with in this undertaking, as little better than chimerical, and had supposed them to arise rather from timidity and unskilfulness, than from the real embarrassments of the winds and seas :

seas : But we were now severely convinced, that these censures were rash and ill-grounded : For the distresses with which we struggled, during the three succeeding months, will not easily be paralleled in the relation of any former naval expedition. This will, I doubt not, be readily allowed by those who shall carefully peruse the ensuing narration.

From the storm which came on before we had well got clear of Streights *Le Maire*, we had a continual succession of such tempestuous weather, as surprized the oldest and most experienced Mariners on board, and obliged them to confess, that what they had hitherto called storms were inconsiderable gales, compared with the violence of these winds, which raised such short, and at the same time such mountainous waves, as greatly surpassed in danger all seas known in any other part of the globe : And it was not without great reason, that this unusual appearance filled us with continual terror ; for, had any one of these waves broke fairly over us, it must, in all probability, have sent us to the bottom. Nor did we escape with terror only ; for the ship rolling incessantly gunwale too, gave us such quick and violent motions, that the men were in perpetual danger of being dashed to pieces against the decks, or sides of the ship. And though we were extremely careful to secure ourselves from these shocks, by grasping some fixed body, yet many of our people were forced from their hold ; some of whom were killed, and others greatly injured ; in particular, one of our best seamen was canted over-board and drowned, another dislocated his neck, a third was thrown into the main-hold and broke his thigh, and one of our Boatswain's Mates broke his collar-bone twice ; not to mention many other accidents of the same kind. These tempests, so dreadful in themselves, though unattended by any other unfavourable circumstance, were yet rendered more mischievous to us by their inequality, and the deceitful intervals which they at some-times afforded ; for though we were oftentimes obliged to lie too for days together under a reefed mizen, and were frequently reduced to lie at the mercy of the waves under our bare poles, yet

now

now and then we ventured to make sail with our courses double reefed ; and the weather proving more tolerable, would perhaps encourage us to set our top-sails ; after which, the wind, without any previous notice, would return upon us with redoubled force, and would in an instant tear our sails from the yards. And that no circumstance might be wanting which could aggrandize our distress, these blasts generally brought with them a great quantity of snow and sleet, which cased our rigging, and froze our sails, thereby rendering them and our cordage brittle, and apt to snap upon the slightest strain, adding great difficulty and labour to the working of the ship, benumbing the limbs of our people, and making them incapable of exerting themselves with their usual activity, and even disabling many of them, by mortifying their toes and fingers. It were indeed endless to enumerate the various disasters of different kinds which befel us ; and I shall only mention the most material, which will sufficiently evince the calamitous condition of the whole squadron, during the course of this navigation.

It was on the 7th of *March*, as hath been already observed, that we passed Streights *Le Maire*, and were immediately afterwards driven to the eastward by a violent storm, and the force of the current which set that way. For the four or five succeeding days we had hard gales of wind from the same quarter, with a most prodigious swell ; so that though we stood, during all that time, towards the S. W, yet we had no reason to imagine, we had made any way to the westward. In this interval we had frequent squalls of rain and snow, and shipped great quantities of water ; after which, for three or four days, though the seas ran mountains high, yet the weather was rather more moderate : But, on the 18th, we had again strong gales of wind with extreme cold, and at midnight the main top-sail split, and one of the straps of the main dead eyes broke. From hence, to the 23d, the weather was more favourable, though often intermixed with rain and sleet, and some hard gales ; but as the waves did not subside, the ship, by labouring in this lofty sea, was now grown so loose in her upper works, that she let in the

water at every seam, so that every part within board was constantly exposed to the sea-water, and scarcely any of the Officers ever lay in dry beds. Indeed it was very rare, that two nights ever passed without many of them being driven from their beds, by the deluge of water that came in upon them.

On the 23d, we had a most violent storm of wind, hail, and rain, with a very great sea ; and though we handed the main top-sail before the height of the squall, yet we found the yard sprung ; and soon after the foot-rope of the main-sail breaking, the main-sail itself split instantly to rags, and, in spite of our endeavours to save it, much the greater part of it was blown over-board. On this, the Commodore made the signal for the Squadron to bring too ; and the storm at length flattening to a calm, we had an opportunity of getting down our main top-sail yard to put the Carpenters to work upon it, and of repairing our rigging ; after which, having bent a new main-sail, we got under sail again with a moderate breeze ; but in less than twenty-four hours we were attacked by another storm, still more furious than the former ; for it proved a perfect hurricane, and reduced us to the necessity of lying too under our bare poles. As our ship kept the wind better than any of the rest, we were obliged in the afternoon, to wear ship, in order to join the Squadron to the leeward, which otherwise we should have been in danger of losing in the night : And as we dared not venture any sail abroad, we were obliged to make use of an expedient, which answered our purpose ; this was putting the helm a weather, and manning the fore-shrouds : But though this method proved successful for the end intended, yet in the execution of it, one of our ablest seamen was canted over-board ; we perceived that notwithstanding the prodigious agitation of the waves, he swam very strong, and it was with the utmost concern that we found ourselves incapable of assisting him ; indeed we were the more grieved at his unhappy fate, as we lost sight of him struggling with the waves, and conceived from the manner in which he swam, that he might  
continue

continue sensible for a considerable time longer, of the horror attending his irretrievable situation.

Before this last mentioned storm was quite abated, we found two of our main-shrouds and one mizen-shroud broke, all which we knotted, and set up immediately. From hence we had an interval of three or four days less tempestuous than usual, but accompanied with a thick fog, in which we were obliged to fire guns almost every half hour, to keep our squadron together. On the 31st, we were alarmed by a gun fired from the *Gloucester*, and a signal made by her to speak with the Commodore; we immediately bore down to her, and were prepared to hear of some terrible disaster; but we were apprized of it before we joined her, for we saw that her main-yard was broke in the slings. This was a grievous misfortune to us all at this juncture; as it was obvious it would prove an hindrance to our sailing, and would detain us the longer in these inhospitable latitudes. But our future success and safety was not to be promoted by repining, but by resolution and activity; and therefore, that this unhappy incident might delay us as little as possible, the Commodore ordered several Carpenters to be put on board the *Gloucester* from the other ships of the squadron, in order to repair her damage with the utmost expedition. And the Captain of the *Tryal*, complaining at the same time, that his pumps were so bad, and the sloop made so great a quantity of water, that he was scarcely able to keep her free, the Commodore ordered him a pump ready fitted from his own ship. It was very fortunate for the *Gloucester* and the *Tryal*, that the weather proved more favourable this day than for many days, both before and after; since by this means they were enabled to receive the assistance which seemed essential to their preservation, and which they could scarcely have had at any other time, as it would have been extremely hazardous to have ventured a boat on board.

The next day, that is, on the 1st of *April*, the weather returned again to its customary bias, the sky looked dark and gloomy,  
and

and the wind began to freshen and to blow in squalls ; however, it was not yet so boisterous, as to prevent our carrying our top-sails close reefed ; but its appearance was such, as plainly prognosticated that a still severer tempest was at hand : And accordingly, on the 3d of *April*, there came on a storm, which both in its violence and continuation (for it lasted three days) exceeded all that we had hitherto encountered. In its first onset we received a furious shock from a sea which broke upon our larboard quarter, where it stove in the quarter gallery, and rushed into the ship like a deluge ; our rigging too suffered extremely from the blow ; amongst the rest one of the straps of the main dead-eyes was broke, as was also a main-shroud and puttock-shroud, so that to ease the strefs upon the masts and shrouds, we lowered both our main and fore-yards, and furled all our sails, and in this posture we lay too for three days, when the storm somewhat abating, we ventured to make sail under our courses only ; but even this we could not do long, for, the next day, which was the 7th, we had another hard gale of wind, with lightning and rain, which obliged us to lie too again all night. It was wonderful, that notwithstanding the hard weather we had endured, no extraordinary accident had happened to any of the squadron since the breaking of the *Gloucester's* main-yard : But this good fortune now no longer attended us ; for at three the next morning, several guns were fired to leeward as signals of distress : And the Commodore making a signal for the squadron to bring too, we, at day-break, saw the *Wager* a considerable way to leeward of any of the other ships ; and we soon perceived that she had lost her mizen-mast, and main top-sail yard. We immediately bore down to her, and found this disaster had arisen from the badness of her iron work ; for all the chain-plates to windward had given way, upon the ship's fetching a deep roll. This proved the more unfortunate to the *Wager*, as her Carpenter had been on board the *Gloucester* ever since the 31st of *March*, and the weather was now too severe to permit him to return : Nor was the *Wager* the only ship of the squadron that suffered in this tempest ; for, the next day, a signal of distress was made by the *Anna*

*Pink*, and, upon speaking with the Master, we learnt that they had broke their fore-stay and the gammon of the bowsprit, and were in no small danger of having all their masts come by the board; so that we were obliged to bear away until they had made all fast, after which we haled upon a wind again.

And now, after all our solicitude, and the numerous ills of every kind, to which we had been incessantly exposed for near forty days, we had great consolation in the flattering hopes we entertained, that our fatigues were drawing to a period, and that we should soon arrive in a more hospitable climate, where we should be amply repayed for all our past sufferings. For, towards the latter end of *March*, we were advanced, by our reckoning, near  $10^{\circ}$  to the westward of the westernmost point of *Terra del Fuego*, and this allowance being double what former Navigators have thought necessary to be taken, in order to compensate the drift of the western current, we esteemed ourselves to be well advanced within the limits of the southern Ocean, and had therefore been ever since standing to the northward with as much expedition, as the turbulence of the weather, and our frequent disasters permitted. And, on the 13th of *April*, we were but a degree in latitude to the southward of the West entrance of the Straights of *Magellan*; so that we fully expected, in a very few days, to have experienced the celebrated tranquillity of the *Pacifick* Ocean.

But these were delusions which only served to render our disappointment more terrible; for the next morning, between one and two, as we were standing to the northward, and the weather, which had till then been hazy, accidentally cleared up, the *Pink* made a signal for seeing land right a-head; and it being but two miles distant, we were all under the most dreadful apprehensions of running on shore; which, had either the wind blown from its usual quarter with its wonted vigour, or had not the moon suddenly shone out, not a ship amongst us could possibly have avoided: But the wind, which some few hours before blew in squalls from the S. W., having fortunately shifted to W. N. W., we were enabled

to stand to the southward, and to clear ourselves of this unexpected danger ; and were fortunate enough by noon to have gained an offing of near twenty leagues.

By the latitude of this land we fell in with, it was agreed to be a part of *Terra del Fuego*, near the southern outlet described in *Frezier's Chart of the Straights of Magellan*, and was supposed to be that point called by him *Cape Noir*. It was indeed most wonderful, that the currents should have driven us to the eastward with such strength ; for the whole Squadron esteemed themselves upwards of ten degrees more westerly than this land, so that in running down, by our account, about nineteen degrees of longitude, we had not really advanced half that distance. And now, instead of having our labours and anxieties relieved by approaching a warmer climate and more tranquil seas, we were to steer again to the southward, and were again to combat those western blasts, which had so often terrified us ; and this too, when we were greatly enfeebled by our men falling sick, and dying apace, and when our spirits, dejected by a long continuance at sea, and by our late disappointment, were much less capable of supporting us in the various difficulties, which we could not but expect in this new undertaking. Add to all this too, the discouragement we received by the diminution of the strength of the Squadron ; for three days before this, we lost sight of the *Severn* and the *Pearl* in the morning ; and though we spread our ships, and beat about for them some time, yet we never saw them more ; whence we had apprehensions that they too might have fallen in with this land in the night, and by being less favoured by the wind and the moon than we were, might have run on shore and have perished. Full of these desponding thoughts and gloomy presages, we stood away to the S. W., prepared by our late disaster to suspect, that how large soever an allowance we made in our westing for the drift of the western current, we might still, upon a second trial, perhaps find it insufficient.



## C. H A P. IX.

## Observations and directions for facilitating the passage of our future Cruisers round Cape Horn.

THE improper season of the year in which we attempted to double Cape Horn, and to which is to be imputed the disappointment (recited in the foregoing chapter) of falling in with *Terra del Fuego*, when we reckoned ourselves above a hundred leagues to the westward of that whole coast, and consequently well advanced into the *Pacifick* Ocean ; this unseasonable navigation, I say, to which we were necessitated by our too late departure from *England*, was the fatal source of all the misfortunes we afterwards encountered. For from hence proceeded the separation of our ships, the destruction of our people, the ruin of our project on *Baldivia*, and of all our other views on the *Spanish* places, and the reduction of our Squadron from the formidable condition in which it passed Streights *Le Maire*, to a couple of shattered half manned cruisers and a sloop, so far disabled, that in many climates they scarcely durst have put to sea. To prevent therefore, as much as in me lies, all ships hereafter bound to the *South-Seas* from suffering the same calamities, I think it my duty to insert in this place such directions and observations, as either my own experience and reflection, or the conversation of the most skilful Navigators on board the Squadron could furnish me with, in relation to the most eligible manner of doubling Cape Horn, whether in regard to the season of the year, the course proper to be steered, or the places of refreshment both on the East and West-side of *South America*.

And first with regard to the proper place for refreshment on the East-side of *South-America*. For this purpose the Island of *St. Catherine's* has been usually recommended by former writers, and on  
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their faith we put in there, as has been formerly mentioned: But the treatment we met with, and the small store of refreshments we could procure there, are sufficient reasons to render all ships for the future cautious, how they trust themselves in the government of Don *Jose Sylva de Paz*; for they may certainly depend on having their strength, condition and designs betrayed to the *Spaniards*, as far as the knowledge, the Governor can procure of these particulars, will give him leave. And as this treacherous conduct is inspired by the views of private gain, in the illicit commerce carried on to the river of *Plate*, rather than by any national affection which the *Portuguese* bear the *Spaniards*, the same perfidy may perhaps be expected from most of the Governors of the *Brazil* coast; since these smuggling engagements are doubtless very extensive and general. And though the Governors should themselves detest so faithless a procedure, yet as ships are perpetually passing from some or other of the *Brazil* ports to the river of *Plate*, the *Spaniards* could scarcely fail of receiving, by this means, casual intelligence of any *British* ships upon the coast; which, however imperfect such intelligence might be, would prove of dangerous import to the views and interests of those cruisers who were thus discovered.

For the *Spanish* trade in the *South-Seas* running all in one track from North to South, with very little deviation to the eastward or westward, it is in the power of two or three cruisers, properly stationed in different parts of this track, to possess themselves of every ship that puts to sea: But this is only so long as they can continue concealed from the neighbouring coast; for the instant an enemy is known to be in those seas, all navigation is prohibited, and consequently all captures are at an end; since the *Spaniards*, well apprized of these advantages of the enemy, send expresses along the coast, and lay a general embargo on all their trade; a measure which they prudentially foresee, will not only prevent their vessels being taken, but will soon lay any cruisers, who have not strength sufficient to attempt their places, under a necessity of returning home. Hence then appears the great importance of concealing all  
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expeditions of this kind ; and hence too it follows, how extremely prejudicial that intelligence may prove, which is given by the *Portuguese* Governors to the *Spaniards*, in relation to the designs of ships touching at the ports of *Brazil*.

However, notwithstanding the inconveniencies we have mentioned of touching on the coast of *Brazil*, it will oftentimes happen, that ships bound round *Cape Horn* will be obliged to call there for a supply of wood and water, and other refreshments. In this case *St. Catherine's* is the last place I would recommend, both as the proper animals for a live stock at sea, as hogs, sheep and fowls cannot be procured there, (for want of which we found ourselves greatly distressed, by being reduced to live almost entirely on salt provisions) and also because from its being nearer the river of *Plate* than many of their other settlements, the inducements and conveniencies of betraying us are much stronger. The place I would recommend is *Rio Janeiro*, where two of our Squadron put in after they were separated from us in passing *Cape Horn* ; for here, as I have been informed by one of the Gentlemen on board those ships, any quantity of hogs and poultry may be procured, and this place being more distant from the river of *Plate*, the difficulty of intelligence is somewhat inhauced, and consequently the chance of continuing there undiscovered, in some degree augmented. Other measures, which may effectually obviate all these embarrassments, shall be considered more at large hereafter.

I next proceed to the consideration of the proper course to be steered for doubling *Cape Horn*. And here, I think, I am sufficiently authorized by our own fatal experience, and by a careful comparison and examination of the journals of former Navigators, to give this piece of advice, which in prudence I think ought never to be departed from : That is, that all ships bound to the *South-Seas*, instead of passing through Straights *Le Maire*, should constantly pass to the eastward of *Staten-land*, and should be invariably bent on running to the southward, as far as the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, before they endeavour to stand to the westward ; and that when they  
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are got into that latitude, they should then make sure of sufficient westing, before they once think of steering to the northward.

But as directions diametrically opposite to these have been formerly given by other writers, it is incumbent on me to produce my reasons for each part of this maxim. And first, as to the passing to the eastward of *Staten-land*. Those who have attended to the risque we ran in passing Streights *Le Maire*, the danger we were in of being driven upon *Staten-land* by the current, when though we happily escaped being put shore, we were yet carried to the eastward of that Island: Those who reflect on this, and on the like accidents which have happened to other ships, will surely not esteem it prudent to pass through Streights *Le Maire*, and run the risque of shipwreck, and after all find themselves no farther to the westward (the only reason hitherto given for this practice) than they might have been in the same time, by a secure navigation in an open sea.

And next, as to the directions I have given for running into the latitude of 61 or 62 South, before any endeavour is made to stand to the westward: The reasons for this precept are, that in all probability the violence of the currents will be hereby avoided, and the weather will prove less tempestuous and uncertain. This last circumstance we ourselves experienced most remarkably; for after we had unexpectedly fallen in with the land, as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, we stood away to the southward to run clear of it, and were no sooner advanced into sixty degrees or upwards, but we met with much better weather, and smoother water than in any other part of the whole passage: The air indeed was very cold and sharp, and we had strong gales, but they were steady and uniform, and we had at the same time sunshine and a clear sky; whereas in the lower latitudes, the winds every now and then intermitted, as it were, to recover new strength, and then returned suddenly in the most violent gusts, threatening at each blast the loss of our masts, which must have ended in our certain destruction. And that the currents in this high latitude would be of much less efficacy

efficacy than nearer the land, seems to be evinced from these considerations, that all currents run with greater violence near the shore than at sea, and that at great distances from shore they are scarcely perceptible : Indeed the reason of this seems sufficiently obvious, if we consider, that constant currents are, in all probability, produced by constant winds, the wind driving before it, though with a slow and imperceptible motion, a large body of water, which being accumulated upon any coast that it meets with, must escape along the shore by the endeavours of its surface, to reduce itself to the same level with the rest of the Ocean. And it is reasonable to suppose, that those violent gusts of wind which we experienced near the shore, so very different from what we found in the latitude of sixty degrees and upwards, may be owing to a similar cause ; for a westerly wind almost perpetually prevails in the southern part of the *Pacifick* Ocean : And this current of air being interrupted by those immense hills called the *Andes*, and by the mountains on *Terra del Fuego*, which together bar up the whole country to the southward as far as *Cape Horn*, a part of it only can force its way over the tops of these prodigious precipices, whilst the rest must naturally follow the direction of the coast, and must range down the land to the southward, and sweep with an impetuous and irregular blast round *Cape Horn*, and the southernmost part of *Terra del Fuego*. However, not to rely on these speculations, we may, I believe, establish, as incontestible, these matters of fact, that both the rapidity of the currents, and the violence of the western gales, are less sensible in the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, than nearer the shore of *Terra del Fuego*.

But though I am satisfied both from our own experience, and the relations of other Navigators, of the importance of the precept I here insist on, that of running into the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, before any endeavours are made to stand to the westward ; yet I would advise no ships hereafter to trust so far to this management, as to neglect another most essential maxim, which is the making this passage in the height of summer, that is, in the months of *December* and

and *January* ; and the more distant the time of passing is taken from this season, the more disastrous it may be reasonably expected to prove. Indeed, if the mere violence of the western winds be considered, the time of our passage, which was about the Equinox, was perhaps the most unfavourable of the whole year ; but then it must be remembered, that independent of the winds there are in the depth of winter many other inconveniencies to be apprehended, which are almost insuperable : For the severity of the cold, and the shortness of the days, would render it impracticable at that season to run so far to the southward as is here recommended ; and the same reasons would greatly augment the alarms of sailing in the neighbourhood of an unknown shore, dreadful in its appearance in the midst of summer, and would make a winter navigation on this coast to be, of all others, the most dismaying and terrible. As I would therefore advise all ships to make their passage in *December* and *January*, if possible ; so I would warn them never to attempt the doubling *Cape Horn*, from the eastward, after the month of *March*.

And now as to the remaining consideration, that is, the properest port for cruisers to refresh at on their first arrival in the *South-Seas* : On this head there is scarcely any choice, the Island of *Juan Fernandes* being the only place that can be prudently recommended for this purpose. For though there are many ports on the western side of *Patagonia*, between the Straights of *Magellan* and the *Spanish* settlements (a plan of one of which, I shall insert in the course of this work) where ships might ride in great safety, might recruit their wood and water, and might procure some few refreshments ; yet that coast is in itself so dangerous from its numerous rocks and breakers, and from the violence of the western winds, which blow constantly full upon it, that it is by no means advisable to fall in with that land, at least till the roads, channels and anchorage in each part of it are accurately surveyed, and both the perils and shelter it abounds with are more distinctly known.

Thus having given the best directions in my power for the success of our cruisers, who may be hereafter bound to the *South-Seas* ; it might be expected that I should again resume the thread of my narration. Yet as both in the preceding and subsequent parts of this work, I have thought it my duty not only to recite all such facts, and to inculcate such maxims as had the least appearance of proving beneficial to future Navigators, but also occasionally to recommend such measures to the Public, as I conceive are adapted to promote the same laudable purpose ; I cannot desist from the present subject, without beseeching those to whom the conduct of our naval affairs is committed, to endeavour to remove the many perplexities and embarrassments with which the navigation to the *South-Seas* is, at present, necessarily encumbered. An effort of this kind could not fail of proving highly honourable to themselves, and extremely beneficial to their country. For it seems to be sufficiently evident, that whatever improvements navigation shall receive, either by the invention of methods that shall render its practice less hazardous, or by the more accurate delineation of the coasts, roads and ports already known, or by the discovery of new nations, or new species of commerce ; it seems, I say, sufficiently evident, that by whatever means navigation is promoted, the conveniencies hence arising must ultimately redound to the emolument of *Great Britain*. Since as our fleets are at present superior to those of the whole world united ; it must be a matchless degree of supineness or mean-spiritedness, if we permitted any of the advantages which new discoveries, or a more extended navigation may produce to mankind, to be ravished from us.

As therefore it appears that all our future expeditions to the *South-Seas* must run a considerable risque of proving abortive, whilst in our passage thither, we are under the necessity of touching at *Brazil* ; the discovery of some place more to the southward, where ships might refresh and supply themselves with the necessary sea-stock for their voyage round *Cape Horn*, would be an expedient which would relieve us from this embarrassment, and would surely be a matter

matter worthy of the attention of the public. Nor does this seem difficult to be effected. For we have already the imperfect knowledge of two places, which might perhaps, on examination, prove extremely convenient for this purpose: One of them is *Pepys's Island*, in the latitude of  $47^{\circ}$  South, and laid down by Dr. *Halley*, about eighty leagues to the eastward of *Cape Blanco*, on the coast of *Patagonia*; the other is *Falkland's Isles*, in the latitude of  $51^{\circ} \frac{1}{2}$  lying nearly South of *Pepys's Island*. The first of these was discovered by Captain *Cowley*, in his Voyage round the World in the year 1686; who represents it as a commodious place for ships to wood and water at, and says, it is provided with a very good and capacious harbour, where a thousand sail of ships might ride at anchor in great safety; that it abounds with fowls, and that as the shore is either rocks or sands, it seems to promise great plenty of fish. The second place, or *Falkland's Isles*, have been seen by many ships both *French* and *English*, being the land laid down by *Frezier*, in his Chart of the extremity of South *America*, under the title of the *New Islands*. *Wood's Rogers*, who run along the N. E. coast of these Isles in the year 1708, tells us, that they extended about two degrees in length, and appeared with gentle descents from hill to hill, and seemed to be good ground, interspersed with woods, and not destitute of harbours. Either of these places, as they are Islands at a considerable distance from the Continent, may be supposed, from their latitude, to lie in a climate sufficiently temperate. It is true, they are too little known to be at present recommended as the most eligible places of refreshment for ships bound to the southward: But if the Admiralty should think it advisable to order them to be surveyed, which may be done at a very small expence, by a vessel fitted out on purpose; and if, on this examination, one or both of these places should appear proper for the purpose intended, it is scarcely to be conceived, of what prodigious import a convenient station might prove, situated so far to the southward, and so near *Cape Horn*. The Duke and Duchess of *Bristol* were but thirty-five days from their losing sight of



*land's* Isles to their arrival at *Juan Fernandes* in the *South-Seas*: And as the returning back is much facilitated by the western winds, I doubt not but a voyage might be made from *Falkland's* Isles to *Juan Fernandes* and back again, in a little more than two months. This, even in time of peace, might be of great consequence to this Nation; and, in time of war, would make us masters of those seas.

And as all discoveries of this kind, though extremely honourable to those who direct and promote them, may yet be carried on at an inconsiderable expence, since small vessels are much the properest to be employed in this service: It were to be wished, that the whole coast of *Patagonia*, *Terra del Fuego*, and *Staten-land*, were carefully surveyed, and the numerous channels, roads and harbours with which they abound, were accurately examined. This might open to us facilities of passing into the *Pacifick* Ocean, which as yet we may be unacquainted with, and would render all that southern navigation infinitely securer than at present; particularly, an exact draught of the West coast of *Patagonia*, from the Streights of *Magellan* to the *Spanish* settlements, might perhaps furnish us with better and more convenient ports for refreshment, and better situated for the purposes either of war or commerce, and above a fortnight's sail nearer to *Falkland's* Islands, than the Island of *Juan Fernandes*. The discovery of this coast hath formerly been thought of such consequence, by reason of its neighbourhood to the *Araucos* and other *Chilian Indians*, who are generally at war, or at least on ill terms with their *Spanish* neighbours, that Sir *John Narborough* was purposely fitted out in the reign of King *Charles II.* to survey the Streights of *Magellan*, the neighbouring coast of *Patagonia*, and the *Spanish* ports on that frontier, with directions, if possible, to procure some intercourse with the *Chilian Indians*, and to establish a commerce and a lasting correspondence with them. His Majesty's views in employing Sir *John Narborough* in this expedition, were not solely the advantage he might hope to receive from the alliance of those savages, in restraining and intimidating the Crown of *Spain*; but he conceived, that, independent of those motives, the immediate traffick with these *Indians* might prove extremely

tremely advantagious to the *English* Nation. For it is well known, that at the first discovery of *Chili* by the *Spaniards*, it abounded with vast quantities of gold, much beyond what it has at any time produced, since it has been in their possession. And hence it has been generally believed, that the richest mines are carefully concealed by the *Indians*, as well knowing that the discovery of them would only excite in the *Spaniards* a greater thirst for conquest and tyranny, and would render their own independence more precarious. But with respect to their commerce with the *English*, these reasons would no longer influence them; since it would be in our power to furnish them with arms and ammunition of all kinds, of which they are extremely desirous, together with many other conveniencies which their intercourse with the *Spaniards* has taught them to relish. They would then, in all probability, open their mines, and gladly embrace a traffick of such mutual convenience to both Nations; for then their gold, instead of proving an incitement to enslave them, would procure them weapons to assert their liberty, to chastise their tyrants, and to secure themselves for ever from the *Spanish* yoke; whilst with our assistance, and under our protection, they might become a considerable people, and might secure to us that wealth, which formerly by the House of *Austria*, and lately by the House of *Bourbon*, has been most mischievously lavished in the pursuit of universal Monarchy.

It is true, Sir *John Narborough* did not succeed in opening this commerce, which in appearance promised so many advantages to this Nation. However, his disappointment was merely accidental, and his transactions upon that coast (besides the many valuable improvements he furnished to geography and navigation), are rather an encouragement for future trials of this kind, than any objection against them; his principal misfortune being the losing company of a small bark which attended him, and having some of his people trappan'd at *Baldivia*. However, it appeared, by the precautions and fear of the *Spaniards*, that they were fully convinced of the practicability of the scheme he was sent to execute, and extremely  
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alarmed with the apprehension of its consequences. It is said, that his Majesty King *Charles* the Second was so far prepossessed with the belief of the emoluments which might redound to the public from this expedition, and was so eager to be informed of the event of it, that having intelligence of Sir *John Narborough's* passing through the *Downs* on his return, he had not patience to attend his arrival at Court, but went himself in his barge to *Gravesend* to meet him.

To facilitate as much as possible any attempts of this kind, which may be, hereafter undertaken, I have, in the annexed plate, given a chart of that part of the world, as far as it is hitherto known, which I flatter myself is in some respects much correcter than any which has been yet published. To evince which, it may be necessary to mention what materials I have principally made use of, and what changes I have introduced different from other authors.

The two most celebrated charts hitherto published of the southernmost part of South *America*, are those of Dr. *Halley*, in his general chart of the magnetic variation, and of *Frezier* in his voyage to the *South-Seas*. But besides these, there is a chart of the Streights of *Magellan*, and of some part of the adjacent coast, by Sir *John Narborough*, above-mentioned, which is doubtless infinitely exacter in that part than *Frezier's*, and in some respects superior to *Halley's*, particularly in what relates to the longitudes of the different parts of those Streights. The coast from Cape *Blanco* to *Terra del Fuego*, and thence to Streights *Le Maire*, we were in some measure capable of correcting by our own observations, as we ranged that shore generally in sight of land. The position of the land to the northward of the Streights of *Magellan*, on the West side, is doubtless laid down in our chart but very imperfectly; and yet I believe it to be much nearer the truth than what has hitherto been done: As it is drawn from the information of some of the *Wager's* crew, who were shipwrecked on that shore, and afterwards coasted it down; and as it agrees pretty nearly with the description of some *Spanish* manuscripts I have seen. The Chan-

nel dividing *Terra del Fuego* is drawn from *Frezier* ; but Sir *Francis Drake*, who first discovered *Cape Horn*, and the S. W. part of *Terra del Fuego*, observed that whole coast to be divided by a great number of inlets, all which he conceived did communicate with the Streights of *Magellan*. And I doubt not, that whenever this country is thoroughly examined, this circumstance will be verified, and *Terra del Fuego* will be found to consist of several Islands.

And having mentioned *Frezier* so often, I must not omit warning all future Navigators, against relying on the longitude of Streights *Le Maire*, or of any part of that coast, laid down in his chart ; the whole being from 8 to 10 degrees too far to the eastward, if any faith can be given to the concurrent evidences of a great number of journals, verified in some particulars by astronomical observation. For instance, Sir *John Narborough* places *Cape Virgin Mary* in  $65^{\circ} : 42'$  of West longitude from the *Lizard*, that is in about  $71^{\circ} \frac{1}{2}$  from *London*. And the ships of our Squadron, who took their departure from *St. Catherine's* (where the longitude was rectified by an observation of the eclipse of the moon) found *Cape Virgin Mary* to be from  $70^{\circ} \frac{1}{4}$ , to  $72^{\circ} \frac{1}{2}$  from *London*, according to their different reckonings : And since there were no circumstances in our run that could render it considerably erroneous, it cannot be esteemed in less than 71 degrees of West longitude ; whereas *Frezier* lays down in less than 66 degrees from *Paris*, that is little more than 63 degrees from *London*, which is doubtless 8 degrees short of its true quantity. Again, our Squadron found *Cape Virgin Mary* and Streights *Le Maire* to be not more than  $2^{\circ} \frac{1}{2}$  different in longitude, which in *Frezier* are distant near 4 degrees ; so that not only the longitude of *Cape St. Bartholomew* is laid down in him near 10 degrees too little, but the coast from the Streights of *Magellan* to Streights *Le Maire*, is enlarged to near double its real extent.

But to have done with *Frezier*, whose errors, the importance of the subject, and not a fondness for cavilling, has obliged me to remark, (though his treatment of Dr. *Halley* might, on the present occasion,

occasion, authorize much severer usage) I must, in the next place, relate wherein the chart I have here inserted differs from that of our learned countryman last mentioned.

It is well known that this Gentleman was sent abroad by the Public, to make such geographical and astronomical observations, as might facilitate the future practice of navigation, and particularly to determine the variation of the compass in such places as he should touch at, and if possible, to ascertain its general laws and affections. These things Dr. *Halley*, to his immortal reputation and the honour of our Nation, in good measure accomplished, especially with regard to the variation of the compass, a subject of all others, the most interesting to those employed in the art of navigation. He likewise corrected the position of the coast of *Brazil*, which had been very erroneously laid down by all former Hydrographers; and from a judicious comparison of the observations of others, he happily succeeded in settling the geography of many considerable places, where he had not himself been. So that the chart he composed, with the variation of the needle marked thereon, being the result of his labours on this subject, was allowed by all *Europe* to be far compleater in its geography than any that had till then been published, whilst it was at the same time most surprisingly exact in the quantity of variation assigned to the different parts of the globe; a subject so very intricate and perplexing, that all general determinations about it had been usually deemed impossible.

But as the only means he had of correcting the situation of those coasts, where he did not touch himself, were the observations of others; when those observations were wanting, or were inaccurate, it was no imputation on his skill, that his decisions were defective. And this upon the best comparison I have been able to make, is the case with regard to that part of his chart, which contains the South-coast of *South America*. For though the coast of *Brazil*, and the opposite coast of *Peru* on the *South-Seas* are laid down, I presume, with the greatest accuracy; yet from about the river of *Plate* on the East side, and its opposite point on the West, the coast gradually declines too

too much to the westward, so as at the Streights of *Magellan* to be, as I conceive, about fifty leagues removed from its true position: At least, this is the result of the observations of our squadron, which agree extremely well with those of Sir *John Narborough*. I must add, that Dr. *Halley* has, in the *Philosophical Transactions*, given the foundation on which he has proceeded, in fixing Port St. *Julian* in  $76^{\circ}\frac{1}{2}$  of West longitude: which the concurrent journals of our squadron place from  $70^{\circ}\frac{1}{4}$  to  $71^{\circ}\frac{1}{2}$ . This he tells us, was an observation of an eclipse of the moon, made at that place by Mr. *Wood*, then Sir *John Narborough's* Lieutenant, and which is said to have happened there at eight in the evening, on the 18th of *September*, 1670. But Captain *Wood's* journal of this whole voyage under Sir *John Narborough* is since published, together with this observation, in which he determines the longitude of Port St. *Julian* to be 73 degrees from *London*, and the time of the eclipse to have been very different from Dr. *Halley's* account. But the numbers he has given are so faultily printed, that nothing can be determined from them.

To what I have already mentioned with regard to the chart hereunto annexed, I shall only add, that to render it more compleat, I have inserted therein the route of our squadron, and have delineated, in the passage round Cape *Horn*, both the real track which we described, and the imaginary track exhibited by our reckoning, whence the violence of the currents in that part of the world, and the enormous deviations which they produce, will appear by inspection. And that no material article might be omitted in this important affair, the soundings on the coast of *Patagonia*, and the variation of the magnetic needle, are annexed to those parts of this track, where, by our observations, we found them to be of the quantity there specified.

## C H A P. X.

From Cape *Noir* to the Island of *Juan Fernandes*.

**A**FTER the mortifying disappointment of falling in with the coast of *Terra del Fuego*, when we esteemed ourselves ten degrees to the westward of it ; as hath been at large recited in the eighth chapter, we stood away to the S. W. till the 22d of *April*, when we were in upwards of 60° of South latitude, and by our account near 6° to the westward of Cape *Noir* ; in this run, we had a series of as favourable weather, as could well be expected in that part of the world, even in a better season : So that this interval, setting the inquietude of our thoughts aside, was by far the most eligible of any we enjoyed from Streights *Le Maire* to the West coast of *America*. This moderate weather continued with little variation till the 24th ; but on the 24th, in the evening the wind began to blow fresh, and soon encreased to a prodigious storm ; and the weather being extremely thick, about midnight we lost sight of the other four ships of the squadron, which, notwithstanding the violence of the preceding storms had hitherto kept in company with us. Nor was this our sole misfortune ; for, the next morning, endeavouring to hand the top-sails, the clew-lines and bunt-lines broke, and the sheets being half flown, every seam in the top-sails was soon split from top to bottom, and the main top-sail shook so strongly in the wind, that it carried away the top lanthorn, and endangered the head of the mast ; however, at length some of the most daring of our men ventured upon the yard, and cut the sail away close to the reefs, though with the utmost hazard of their lives. Whilst at the same time, the foretop-sail beat about the yard with so much fury, that it was soon blown to pieces ; nor was our attention to our top-sails our sole employments, for the main-sail blew loose,

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which obliged us to lower down the yard to secure the fail, and the fore-yard being likewise lowered, we lay too under a mizen : In this storm besides the loss of our top-fails, we had much of our rigging broke, and lost a main studding-fail-boom out of the chains.

On the 25th, about noon, the weather became more moderate, which enabled us to sway up our yards, and to repair, in the best manner we could, our shattered rigging ; but still we had no sight of the rest of our squadron, nor indeed were we joined by any of them again, till after our arrival at *Juan Fernandes* ; nor did any two of them, as we have since learned, continue in company together : This total and almost instantaneous separation was the more wonderful, as we had hitherto kept together for seven weeks, through all the reiterated tempests of this turbulent climate. It must indeed be owned, that we had hence room to expect, that we might make our passage in a shorter time, than if we had continued together, because we could now make the best of our way without being retarded by the misfortunes of the other ships ; but then we had the melancholy reflection, that we ourselves were hereby deprived of the assistance of others, and our safety would depend upon our single ship ; so that if a plank started, or any other accident of the same nature should take place, we must all irrecoverably perish ; or should we be driven on shore, we had the uncomfortable prospect of ending our days on some desolate coast, without any reasonable hope of ever getting off again : Whereas with another ship in company, all these calamities are much less formidable, since in every kind of danger, there would be some probability that one ship at least might escape, and might be capable of preserving or relieving the crew of the other.

The remaining part of this month of *April* we had generally hard gales, although we had been every day, since the 22d, edging to the northward ; however, on the last day of the month, we flattered ourselves with the expectation of soon terminating all our sufferings, for we that day found ourselves in the latitude of  $54^{\circ} : 13'$ , which being to the northward of the Straights of *Magellan*, we were



assured that we had compleated our passage, and had arrived in the confines of the southern Ocean ; and this Ocean being denominated *Pacifick*, from the equability of the seasons which are said to prevail there, and the facility and security with which navigation is there carried on, we doubted not but we should be speedily cheared with the moderate gales, the smooth water, and the temperate air for which that tract of the globe has been so renowned. And under the influence of these pleasing circumstances, we hoped to experience some kind of compensation, for the complicated miseries, which had so constantly attended us for the last eight weeks. But here we were again disappointed ; for in the succeeding month of *May*, our sufferings rose to a much higher pitch than they had ever yet done, whether we consider the violence of the storms, the shattering of our sails and rigging, or the diminishing and weakening of our crew by deaths and sickness, and the probable prospect of our total destruction. All this will be sufficiently evident, from the following circumstantial account of our diversified misfortunes.

Soon after our passing Straights *Le Maire*, the scurvy began to make its appearance amongst us ; and our long continuance at sea, the fatigue we underwent, and the various disappointments we met with, had occasioned its spreading to such a degree, that at the latter end of *April*, there were but few on board who were not in some degree afflicted with it, and that month no less than forty-three died of it on board the *Centurion*. But though we thought that the distemper had then risen to an extraordinary height, and were willing to hope, that as we advanced to the northward, its malignity would abate, yet we found on the contrary, that in the month of *May* we lost near double that number : And as we did not get to land till the middle of *June*, the mortality went on increasing, and the disease extended itself so prodigiously, that after the loss of above two hundred men, we could not at last muster more than six fore-mast men in a watch capable of duty.

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This disease so frequently attending long voyages, and so particularly destructive to us, is surely the most singular and unaccountable of any that affects the human body: Its symptoms are inconstant and innumerable, and its progress and effects extremely irregular; for scarcely any two persons have complaints exactly resembling each other, and where there hath been found some conformity in the symptoms, the order of their appearance has been totally different. However, tho' it frequently puts on the form of many other diseases, and is therefore not to be described by any exclusive and infallible criterions; yet there are some symptoms which are more general than the rest, and occurring the ofteneft, deserve a more particular enumeration. These common appearances are large discoloured spots dispersed over the whole surface of the body, swelled legs, putrid gums, and above all, an extraordinary lassitude of the whole body, especially after any exercise, however inconsiderable; and this lassitude at last degenerates into a proneness to swoon and even die on the least exertion of strength, or even on the least motion.

This disease is likewise usually attended with a strange dejection of the spirits, and with shiverings, tremblings, and a disposition to be seized with the most dreadful terrors on the slightest accident. Indeed it was most remarkable, in all our reiterated experience of this malady, that whatever discouraged our people, or at any time damped their hopes, never failed to add new vigour to the distemper; for it usually killed those who were in the last stages of it, and confined those to their hammocks, who were before capable of some kind of duty; so that it seemed as if alacrity of mind, and sanguine thoughts, were no contemptible preservatives from its fatal malignity.

But it is not easy to compleat the long roll of the various concomitants of this disease; for it often produced putrid fevers, pleurifies, the jaundice, and violent rheumatick pains, and sometimes it occasioned an obstinate costiveness, which was generally attended with a difficulty of breathing; and this was esteemed the most deadly of all the scorbutick symptoms: At other times the whole  
body,

body, but more especially the legs, were subject to ulcers of the worst kind, attended with rotten bones, and such a luxuriance of fungous flesh, as yielded to no remedy. But a most extraordinary circumstance, and what would be scarcely credible upon any single evidence, is, that the scars of wounds which had been for many years healed, were forced open again by this virulent distemper : Of this, there was a remarkable instance in one of the invalids on board the *Centurion*, who had been wounded above fifty years before at the battle of the *Boyne* ; for though he was cured soon after, and had continued well for a great number of years past, yet on his being attacked by the scurvy, his wounds, in the progress of his disease, broke out afresh, and appeared as if they had never been healed : Nay, what is still more astonishing, the callous of a broken bone, which had been compleatly formed for a long time, was found to be hereby dissolved, and the fracture seemed as if it had never been consolidated. Indeed, the effects of this disease were in almost every instance wonderful ; for many of our people, though confined to their hammocks, appeared to have no inconsiderable share of health, for they eat and drank heartily, were chearful, and talked with much seeming vigour, and with a loud strong tone of voice ; and yet, on their being the least moved, though it was only from one part of the ship to the other, and that too in their hammocks, they have immediately expired ; and others, who have confided in their seeming strength, and have resolved to get out of their hammocks, have died before they could well reach the deck ; nor was it an uncommon thing for those who were able to walk the deck, and to do some kind of duty, to drop down dead in an instant, on any endeavours to act with their utmost effort, many of our people having perished in this manner during the course of this voyage.

With this terrible disease we struggled the greatest part of the time of our beating round *Cape Horn* ; and though it did not then rage with its utmost violence, yet we buried no less than forty-three men on board the *Centurion*, in the month of *April*, as hath been

been already observed, however, we still entertained hopes, that when we should have once secured our passage round the Cape, we should put a period to this, and all the other evils which had so constantly pursued us. But it was our misfortune to find, that the *Pacific* Ocean was to us less hospitable than the turbulent neighbourhood of *Terra del Fuego* and *Cape Horn*. For being arrived, on the 8th of *May*, off the Island of *Socoro*, which was the first rendezvous appointed for the squadron, and where we hoped to have met with some of our companions, we cruized for them in that station several days. But here we were not only disappointed in our expectations of being joined by our friends, and were thereby induced to favour the gloomy suggestions of their having all perished; but we were likewise perpetually alarmed with the fears of being driven on shore upon this coast, which appeared too craggy and irregular to give us the least prospect, that in such a case any of us could possibly escape immediate destruction. For the land had indeed a most tremendous aspect: The most distant part of it, and which appeared far within the country, being the mountains usually called the *Andes* or *Cordilleras*, was extremely high and covered with snow; and the coast itself seemed quite rocky and barren, and the water's edge skirted with precipices. In some places indeed we discerned several deep bays running into the land, but the entrance into them was generally blocked up by numbers of little Islands; and though it was not improbable but there might be convenient shelter in some of those bays, and proper channels leading thereto; yet, as we were utterly ignorant of the coast, had we been driven ashore by the western winds which blew almost constantly there, we did not expect to have avoided the loss of our ship and of our lives.

This continued peril, which lasted for above a fortnight, was greatly aggravated by the difficulties we found in working the ship; as the scurvy had by this time destroyed so great a part of our hands, and had in some degree affected almost the whole crew. Nor did we, as we hoped, find the winds less violent, as we advanced to the northward; for we had often prodigious squalls which split  
our

our sails, greatly damaged our rigging, and endangered our masts. Indeed, during the greatest part of the time we were upon this coast, the wind blew so hard, that in another situation, where we had sufficient sea-room, we should certainly have lain too ; but in the present exigency we were necessitated to carry both our courses and top-sails, in order to keep clear of this lee-shore. In one of these squalls, which was attended by several violent claps of thunder, a sudden flash of fire darted along our decks, which, dividing, exploded with a report like that of several pistols, and wounded many of our men and officers as it passed, marking them in different parts of the body : This flame was attended with a strong sulphurous stench, and was doubtless of the same nature with the larger and more violent blasts of lightning which then filled the air.

It were endless to recite minutely the various disasters, fatigues and terrors which we encountered on this coast ; all these went on encreasing till the 22d of *May*, at which time, the fury of all the storms which we had hitherto encountered, seemed to be combined, and to have conspired our destruction. In this hurricane almost all our sails were split, and great part of our standing rigging broken ; and, about eight in the evening, a mountainous over-grown sea took us upon our starboard-quarter, and gave us so prodigious a shock, that several of our shrouds broke with the jerk, by which our masts were greatly endangered ; our ballast and stores too were so strangely shifted, that the ship heeled afterwards two streaks to port. Indeed it was a most tremendous blow, and we were thrown into the utmost consternation from the apprehension of instantly foundering ; and though the wind abated in a few hours, yet, as we had no more sails left in a condition to bend to our yards, the ship laboured very much in a hollow sea, rolling gunwale too, for want of sail to steady her : So that we expected our masts, which were now very slenderly supported, to come by the board every moment. However, we exerted ourselves the best we could to stirrup our shrouds, to reeve new lanyards, and to mend our sails ; but while these necessary operations were carrying on, we ran great risque of being driven

driven on shore on the Island of *Chiloe*, which was not far distant from us ; but in the midst of our peril the wind happily shifted to the southward, and we steered off the land with the main-sail only, the Master and myself undertaking the management of the helm, while every one else on board was busied in securing the masts, and bending the sails as fast as they could be repaired. This was the last effort of that stormy climate ; for in a day or two after, we got clear of the land, and found the weather more moderate than we had yet experienced since our passing Straights *Le Maire*. And now having cruized in vain for more than a fortnight in quest of the other ships of the Squadron, it was resolved to take the advantage of the present favourable season and the offing we had made from this terrible coast, and to make the best of our way for the Island of *Juan Fernandes*. For though our next rendezvous was appointed off the harbour of *Baldivia*, yet as we had hitherto seen none of our companions at this first rendezvous, it was not to be supposed that any of them would be found at the second : Indeed we had the greatest reason to suspect, that all but ourselves had perished. Besides, we were by this time reduced to so low a condition, that instead of attempting to attack the places of the enemy, our utmost hopes could only suggest to us the possibility of saving the ship, and some part of the remaining enfeebled crew, by our speedy arrival at *Juan Fernandes*; for this was the only road in that part of the world where there was any probability of our recovering our sick, or refitting our vessel, and consequently our getting thither was the only chance we had left to avoid perishing at sea.

Our deplorable situation then allowing no room for deliberation, we stood for the Island of *Juan Fernandes* ; and to save time, which was now extremely precious, (our men dying four, five and six in a day) and likewise to avoid being engaged again with a lee-shore, we resolved, if possible to hit the Island upon a meridian. And, on the 28th of *May*, being nearly in the parallel upon which it is laid down, we had great expectations of seeing it : But not finding

it in the position in which the charts had taught us to expect it, we began to fear that we had got too far to the westward ; and therefore, though the Commodore himself was strongly persuaded, that he saw it on the morning of the 28th, yet his Officers believing it to be only a cloud, to which opinion the haziness of the weather gave some kind of countenance, it was, on a consultation, resolved to stand to the eastward, in the parallel of the Island ; as it was certain, that by this course we should either fall in with the Island, if we were already to the westward of it ; or should at least make the main-land of *Chili*, from whence we might take a new departure, and assure ourselves, by running to the westward afterwards, of not missing the Island a second time.

On the 30th of *May*, we had a view of the Continent of *Chili*, distant about twelve or thirteen leagues ; the land made exceeding high and uneven, and appeared quite white ; what we saw being doubtless a part of the *Cordilleras*, which are always covered with snow. Though by this view of the land we ascertained our position, yet it gave us great uneasiness to find that we had so needlessly altered our course, when we were, in all probability, just upon the point of making the Island ; for the mortality amongst us was now increased to a most dreadful degree, and those who remained alive were utterly dispirited by this new disappointment, and the prospect of their longer continuance at sea : Our water too began to grow scarce ; so that a general dejection prevailed amongst us, which added much to the virulence of the disease, and destroyed numbers of our best men ; and to all these calamities there was added this vexatious circumstance, that when, after having got a sight of the Main, we tacked and stood to the westward in quest of the Island, we were so much delayed by calms and contrary winds, that it cost us nine days to regain the westing, which, when we stood to the eastward, we ran down in two. In this desponding condition, with a crazy ship, a great scarcity of fresh water, and a crew so universally diseased, that there were not above ten fore-mast men in a watch capable of doing duty, and even some of these lame, and

unable to go aloft: Under these disheartening circumstances, we stood to the westward; and, on the 9th of *June*, at day-break, we at last discovered the long-wished for Island of *Juan Fernandes*. With this discovery, I shall close this chapter and the first book, after observing (which will furnish a very strong image of our unparalleled distresses) that by our suspecting ourselves to be to the westward of the Island on the 28th of *May*, and in consequence of this, standing in for the Main, we lost between seventy and eighty of our men, whom we should doubtless have saved had we made the Island that day, which had we kept on our course for a few hours longer we could not have failed to have done.

## *E N D* of B O O K I.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































